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ABSTRACT 
Africa is considered to be an emerging market, due to the large number of 
industries investing into Africa as a result of its low cost of employment and 
the volume of natural resources. Recently SARS has recognized the benefits 
of South Africa as an ideal location in which to establish an intermediary 
holding company through which investments into Africa may be channelled. 
There are a many factors that contribute to this, such as the wide treaty 
network established by South Africa, the growing economic sector and the 
close proximity to other African countries. In order to be considered an 
effective regime, the newly introduced Headquarter company regime (the 
new South African HQCR) will have to illustrate that the best practice 
characteristics required in an intermediary holding company jurisdiction 
are in fact present in South Africa. Even if these characteristics are present, 
the there are still a number of other factors that may hinder the effectiveness 
of such a regime.  The most noticeable of which is the attractiveness of other 
well known and established headquarter company regimes such as 
Mauritius. Mauritius offers an attractive intermediary holding company 
regime to offshore investors due to the close proximity to Africa, the lack of 
exchange control regulations, large treaty networks with well-negotiated 
rates and the low effective tax rate. Should South Africa be able to compete 
with these traits, this may pose a risk that South Africa will be considered to 
participate in harmful tax practices. In these instances, the shifting of profits 
to a lower tax jurisdiction would likely result in double taxation through the 
non-applicability of DTAs. This view coincides with the substantial move 
against abuse of DTAs in what is referred to as the one world tax system. 
The purpose of this paper is therefore to consider whether or not the new 
South African HQCR established in South Africa will be considered as an 
effective regime based on the characteristics provided and whether or not 
this regime will be able to compete with other more prominent regimes such 
as Mauritius. Further considerations are also addressed as to whether or not 
the regime may be viewed as a harmful tax regime. The success of the 
regime is imperative on this consideration as strong initiatives are being 
undertaken worldwide to avoid the erosion of a countries tax base. In light 
of this it has become an increasingly difficult to promote a Headquarter 
company regime that is in conflict to these initiatives. The purpose of this 
paper is to establish whether or not SARS has managed to establish an 
effective headquarter company in light of all of the above.       
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1. Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The African continent is identified as one of the world’s largest 
emerging markets due to the large volumes of natural resources 
and the growing population. Consequently, many mining 
companies and banks have invested into this market in the last 
few years.  
In order to achieve the greatest benefit from investing into 
emerging markets, many companies consider tax planning to be 
an integral part of the process. Where detailed tax planning has 
not been undertaken, a company may be subject to double 
taxation. (Ogley, 1993, p. 2) has identified this dilemma by 
stating that:  
fundamental to the problem of double taxation are the questions of 
overall ceiling on the burden of tax to which an investor is to be exposed, 
and how the total tax take is to be shared between the revenue authorities 
of the countries’ concerned   
The problem of double taxation can be avoided through the 
careful tax planning of establishing an intermediary company in 
a jurisdiction that minimises the risk of double tax through the 
implementation of double tax agreements (DTAs).  
This intermediary holding company would also establish a base 
from which to conduct business and investments into the 
offshore markets. A large number of tax and business 
considerations should therefore be taken into account when 
selecting the regime in which the intermediary holding company 
will be established.  The establishment of a large number of 
intermediary holding companies would result in an increased 
flow of economic activities being channelled through the 
jurisdiction. As a result many countries have attempted to 
introduce regimes that cater to these characteristics.   
South Africa has attempted a similar project through the 
introduction of the new South African Headquarter Company 
regime under section 9I of the Income Tax Act (Act). The 
effectiveness of this regime is dependent on a number of factors, 
such as whether or not the regime encompasses the 
characteristics that are identified as best practice characteristics 
provided by other intermediary holding company regimes, 
offers unique investment benefits to offshore investors and 
finally whether or not this regime falls foul of the harmful tax 
practices that are identified with tax havens.  
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The first sub-problem identified assesses whether or not the new 
South African Headquarter Company Regime provides for the 
best practice characteristics of an intermediary holding 
company. Chapter 2 enables us to addresses the first sub-
problem by highlighting the best practice characteristics. 
Chapter 2 identifies these characteristics from both a tax and 
non-tax perspective. Olivier and Honiball (2011) emphasises 
that the economic benefits of establishing an intermediary 
holding company should be non-tax in nature as the tax benefits 
are at best short to medium term. The economic benefits must 
therefore be considered to out-weigh the potential tax benefits. 
A few of the non-tax considerations discussed in Chapter 2 are: 
exchange control, the raising of external finance, group 
reorganisation and asset protection.  Chapter 2 also considers 
the tax reason for establishing an intermediary holding 
company. These reasons include the absence or reduction of 
withholding taxes, the application of a large DTA network, the 
deference or elimination of capital gains tax, the deference of 
tax on operating income, optimisation of foreign tax credits, 
reduction of the impact of foreign exchange gains or losses and 
the re-characterisation of the nature of income.  
As a result of the fact that the National Department of Treasury 
in South Africa considered South Africa to meet a large number 
of the identified tax and non-tax characteristics, they have 
regarded South Africa as an ideal jurisdiction in which to 
establish an intermediary holding or headquarter company.  
These characteristics have been identified as South Africa’s 
close proximity to other African countries, effective 
communication networks and the growing business sector. In 
addition to this, South Africa has also managed to establish one 
of the largest treaty networks into Africa. This would provide a 
parent company (i.e. the offshore investor) with tax benefits 
(Example. the reduction of withholding taxes in a certain of the 
double tax agreements entered into). It was determined in an 
interview with a representative from the Department of National 
Treasury (National Treasury), namely Lutando Mvovo (2012), 
the reasons for identifying South Africa as an ideal holding 
company jurisdiction is summarised in the statement below: 
We also considered non-tax issues such as our infrastructure in 
comparison to other African countries, sophistication of our financial 
sector, our geographical location, our international and political relations 
(being a member of IBSA, possibility of become a members of BRIC as 
it was called then, part of the G20 etc.). On the tax side of our tax treaty 
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network, we had about 68 tax treaties, including 19 tax treaties with 
African countries.    
To make use of these characteristics, the Department of 
National Treasury has introduced what is known as the 
Headquarter Company Regime (the new South African HQCR). 
The implementation of this regime has been built on the 
previous International Headquarter Company Regime (IHCR) 
that was introduced in 2002.  
Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion on the history of the 
IHCR in South Africa. This discussion considers why the 
previous regime was abolished and how the regime has since 
evolved. This history is significant in obtaining an 
understanding of the new South African HQCR, what 
considerations were accounted for in establishing the new South 
African HQCR, and whether or not the considerations delivered 
the required characteristics of an intermediary company.  This is 
achieved through detailed comparison of the best practice 
characteristics identified in chapter 2 above, and the 
characteristics implemented in the new HQCR. The comparison 
addresses the first sub-problem highlighted above in 
determining whether or not the best practice characteristics are 
found in the new South African HQCR. If the characteristics 
provided for in the new South African HQCR are not considered 
to be unique, the new HQCR may be found to be ineffective in 
light of already established headquarter company jurisdictions 
as identified by the second sub-problem.  
Chapter 4 addresses the second sub-problem by providing a 
comparison with another prominent headquarter company 
regime (namely Mauritius). This comparison assesses the 
benefits provided under the new South African HQCR and 
determines if they can be found in other jurisdictions. The 
discussion also identifies any benefits that are provided for in 
other jurisdictions, but are considered to be lacking in the new 
South African HQCR.  
As Mauritius is renowned for providing companies with both 
commercial viability and tax benefits, it will prove difficult to 
contest with when weighing up the viability of South Africa as a 
headquarter company regime.  
Although Mauritius is generally found to be an effective 
intermediary holding company jurisdiction, it has regularly 
received publicity as a tax haven that is used to reduce taxes 
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paid to African and other jurisdictions. This is a common danger 
when establishing a headquarter company regime, in that the 
regime will be considered to illustrate the harmful tax practices 
similar to those provided for by a tax haven, as identified in the 
third sub-problem. 
The term tax haven triggers many negative connotations that 
may result in a denial of benefits under double tax agreements 
(DTAs). The denial of benefits may occur where funds are 
passed through these jurisdictions via an intermediary holding 
company, and the beneficial owner of the income or funds is not 
considered to be the intermediary holding company. Under 
these circumstances, the benefits normally available under a 
DTA will be denied as a result of the concept of beneficial 
ownership. The concept of the beneficial ownership was 
introduced to a few DTAs to avoid treaty shopping (Olivier & 
Honiball, 2011). 
A deciding factor as to whether or not the benefits under a DTA 
applies is often considered in terms of whether or not the 
jurisdiction enters into the harmful tax practices associated with 
a tax haven or alternatively an offshore finance centre (“OFC”).   
Tax havens are considered to be involved in harmful tax 
practices and are the DTAs are therefore subject to increased 
anti-avoidance initiatives that are aimed at preventing the 
erosion of tax bases in a jurisdiction. This is achieved by 
limiting the treaty benefits available to jurisdictions identified as 
tax havens as the DTAs entered into are subject to anti-
avoidance provisions such as the concept of beneficial 
ownership described above. Although OFCs provide similar 
characteristics to tax havens, they are largely aimed at providing 
a financing “hub” and for this reason it may be easier for an 
OFC to enter into a DTA and benefit from the reduced rates 
provided in DTAs. If a headquarter company regime is 
associated with the harmful tax practices often illustrated by a 
tax havens or OFCs, the jurisdiction in which the regime 
operates may become subject to similar anti avoidance 
provisions which prove detrimental to the effectiveness of such 
a regime. This highlights the third sub-problem as to whether or 
not the characteristics that are applied by the new South African 
HQCR may be considered as harmful tax practices that would 
result in the imposition of anti-avoidance provisions on South 
Africa. 
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In chapter 5 this sub-problem is addressed by considering the 
definition of a tax haven and determining what the similar and 
the dissimilar harmful tax practices tax haven and an OFC 
regimes offer.  The identified harmful tax practices have been 
recognised by the OECD (OECD, 1998)as: 
a scheme that is merely a conduit and absent the regime, the investment 
flow would be unlikely to go through the country providing the regime. 
In addressing the third sub-problem a conclusion is drawn as to 
whether or not the new South African HQCR mimics the 
harmful tax practices identified in these regimes.   
The establishment of both tax haven and OFC regimes are in 
complete contradiction to the growing trend to establish an 
international tax system that lends itself to transparency. A 
strong initiative has been and continues to be implemented 
against harmful tax practices that erode the tax base of 
jurisdictions. Various initiatives include limitation of the 
benefits available under DTAs (as mentioned above), anti-
money laundering initiatives, and other proposals directly aimed 
at minimising tax abuse.  
Chapter 6 considers the various initiatives that have taken a 
stand against tax base erosion and profit shifting transactions. 
The largest of these initiatives, and the most well known, is the 
OECD initiative. The impact of this initiative is the most 
effective as many of the DTAs ratified in South Africa are 
concluded on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and 
on Capital (OECD Model Convention). The OECD model 
convention is aimed at minimising tax base erosion; the large 
number of anti-avoidance articles that are regularly agreed on as 
part of the DTAs entered into illustrates this.  
This growing objective of transparency is making it increasingly 
difficult for a tax havens and OFC’s to function and maintain 
taxpayer’s rights and privacy, while still remaining within the 
stringent requirements, such as the exchange of information 
agreements, CFC regime, transfer pricing legislation, that is 
imposed by the OECD.   
Chapter 6 reviews the requirements, the growing initiatives, 
recent developments and action points that have been 
determined to prohibit base erosion and profit shifting. The 
fourth sub-problem is addressed by determining whether or not 
the provisions under these initiatives were considered and 
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incorporated in establishing the new HQCR or alternatively 
what effect these initiatives will have on the new HQCR in the 
future if they were not considered.  
Chapter 7 concludes the report and presents an overview of its 
findings as to whether or not the new HQCR in South Africa 
can be considered to be an ideal headquarter company regime 
under which to incorporate an intermediary holding company.  
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2. Chapter 2 – Characteristics of an ideal Head Quarter 
Company jurisdiction  
Many multinational enterprises (MNE’S) look to establish what is 
generally known as an intermediary holding company in a 
jurisdiction that provides both tax and other commercial benefits. 
This allows for MNE’s to obtain a distinct advantage over 
companies, which are only operational within one jurisdiction (i.e. 
the operational jurisdiction in which the MNE is situated), that may 
be subject to a higher effective tax rate. This advantage has been 
recognised over the years and has been identified as being able to: 
choose to locate production or some other activity in a country with a 
lower overall cost structure because the country in question poses a lesser 
burden of tax on such activity (Ogley, 1993) 
In many instances, this idea has been extended, to consider how the 
intermediary company may in fact benefit from the jurisdiction in 
which it is situated. The stripping of profits from a company and 
the distribution thereof to a lower tax jurisdiction, such as a tax 
haven, will positively benefit the low tax jurisdiction by the 
increase in economic activities in that jurisdiction. As a result, 
many jurisdictions have attempted to establish a regime that 
provides the characteristics associated with a low tax jurisdiction.  
The purpose of this chapter is to identify what these characteristics 
are and how they may be beneficial to a MNE. 
The effectiveness of a headquarter company can be assessed by 
determining whether or not the regime provides for the best 
practice tax characteristics that are considered to be (Olivier & 
Honiball, 2011): 
2.1 A low tax rate on income earned and the absence of tax on 
dividends earned;  
2.2 The absence of withholding tax on distributions and other 
payments (such as interest, royalties, and management fees) 
made to non-residents; 
2.3 A large network of DTAs;  
2.4 The absence of capital gains tax on the profit earned from 
disposals; 
2.5 The absence of tax on an increase in share capital; 
2.6 The absence of transfer pricing regulations; 
2.7 The absence of a controlled foreign company regime; and 
2.8 The optimisation of foreign tax credits. 
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As previously mentioned the tax benefits are short to medium term 
at best and commercial characteristics should therefore be 
considered when selecting an intermediary holding company 
jurisdiction. The commercial characteristics are identified as 
(Olivier & Honiball, 2011): 
2.9 The ability to undertake group reorganisations and asset 
protection;  
2.10 The reduction of exchange rate fluctuations on the profit of 
a company by investing in jurisdiction that transacts in a 
stable currency; 
2.11 The absence of exchange control regime to allow for the 
raising of external finance at a more competitive rate, and 
the free flow of funds (such as dividends, interest and 
management fees) to the ultimate parent company. 
All of the above characteristics are elaborated on below (Olivier & 
Honiball, 2011). 
2.1 A low tax rate on income earned and the absence of 
tax on dividends earned 
An intermediary holding company is likely to earn dividend 
income from the subsidiaries in which it invests. In 
practice, this dividend income is in turn passed on to the 
ultimate parent company. The ideal intermediary holding 
company jurisdiction should therefore cater for an 
exemption in respect of dividend income earned.  
 
Likewise, the intermediary holding company jurisdiction 
should also cater for the transfer of profits from the 
subsidiary company via other forms of income earned (i.e. 
interest income, royalty income or management fee income) 
to be taxed at a minimal rate or under a special regime.  In 
order to avoid the classification of a tax haven, many 
jurisdictions do not provide for a minimal corporate tax 
rate, instead a tax credit is offered either for certain types of 
income (i.e. foreign income or capital contributions) or as a 
blanket rule in respect of a specific person (such as a non-
resident incorporated under a specific regime).   
 
This allows for the intermediary company to pass on the 
income earned to the ultimate parent company, without 
subjecting these amounts to additional tax (over and above 
the tax already paid by the subsidiary).   
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A common alternative to remitting the funds back to the 
parent company (of the intermediary holding company), as 
described above, is to allow for profits to accumulate in the 
intermediary holding company and reinvest these profits 
from the intermediary holding company when required.  If 
this alternative is preferred it would be imperative that the 
intermediary company jurisdiction applies a low corporate 
tax rate.  
  
2.2 The absence of withholding tax on distributions and 
other payments to non-residents 
The remission of funds to the parent company results in an 
erosion of the subsidiary countries’ capital base as there 
will be less funds reinvested into the respective economy.  
This can be avoided by levying a tax on payments made to 
non-resident companies. The difficulty of collecting these 
taxes is mitigated through imposing withholding taxes on 
foreign residents (Olivier & Honiball, 2011).  
 
Withholding taxes are levied on: 
2.2.1 Dividend payments made to a foreign shareholder 
Ideally one would look to establish an intermediary holding 
company in a jurisdiction that would allow for the parent 
company to extract profits from the low tax jurisdiction 
without being subject to additional taxes levied thereon. 
The intermediary company should therefore not have 
imposed upon it dividends withholding tax on dividend 
payments made to non-resident shareholders.  
2.2.2 Interest withholding tax 
In many instances an intermediary holding company, is 
established through the provision of loan funding by the 
parent company. An interest charge is usually levied on this 
loan, thereby allowing the intermediary holding company 
(i.e. the company paying the interest) to obtain a tax 
deduction for the amount paid (subject to transfer pricing 
considerations, if applicable). If the intermediary company 
is situated in a jurisdiction that levies a withholding tax on 
these payments, the levying of interest on the loan would 
result in double tax (i.e. in the hands of the recipient as 
gross income and the withholding tax levied on the non-
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resident payment). It is therefore imperative that the 
intermediary company be situated in a tax friendly 
jurisdiction that would allow for the interest payments to be 
made to the parent company free from withholding taxes.  
2.2.3 Royalties withholding tax  
Intermediary companies commonly use intellectual 
property ('IP') relating to group companies to transfer funds 
to the parent company (i.e. a non-resident company). This 
also allows for the profit to be retained within the group. If 
the intermediary company is situated in a jurisdiction that 
levies a withholding tax on these payments, the royalty 
payments would result in double tax (i.e. in the hands of the 
recipient as gross income and the withholding tax levied on 
the non-resident payment). It is therefore imperative that 
the intermediary holding company jurisdiction would not 
levy withholding tax on the royalty payments made.  
2.2.4 Services withholding tax 
Services withholding tax is becoming more prevalent in 
certain jurisdictions as a means to identify transactions with 
non-residents. A common practice in respect of profit 
extraction is to levy a management fee from the 
intermediary holding company to the parent company.  
Where a services withholding tax is levied, this would 
result in double taxation (i.e. as gross income in the hands 
of the recipient and withholding tax on the non-resident 
payment). Ideally, an intermediary holding company must 
therefore be established in a jurisdiction that does not levy a 
services withholding tax.    
2.3 A large network of DTA  
Many jurisdictions enter into DTAs to avoid the same 
income being subject to tax in two separate jurisdictions. 
This is normally achieved through agreeing on an overall 
ceiling (Ogley, 1993) for the total tax take based on a 
predetermined profit sharing. In many instances full taxing 
rights are provided to one of the two jurisdictions. In other 
instances limited taxing rights are provided to the second 
jurisdiction. The limited taxing rights are agreed at a lower 
withholding tax rate than the local legislation would have 
applied had no DTA existed. 
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As a result of this, DTAs are able to provide potential 
investors with comfort that double tax will not be levied in 
respect of the two relevant jurisdictions.  
 
An intermediary holding company should therefore look to 
be established in a jurisdiction with a large treaty network 
to ensure that the potential investor is shielded from double 
tax as well as to enable the potential investor to benefit 
from reduced withholding tax rates.   
2.4 The absence of capital gains tax on the profit 
earned from disposals. 
Capital gains tax (“CGT”) is generally levied by 
jurisdictions in one of two methods (Olivier & Honiball, 
2011): 
• Deemed disposal (i.e. if tax residency is terminated); 
and 
• On the actual disposal of shares. 
Both of these instances would prove to be limiting for an 
intermediary holding company as: 
• the business of a holding company is to purchase 
and dispose of investments on a regular basis, and it 
would be ineffective to subject the intermediary 
holding company to CGT in respect of every sales 
transaction; and  
• Should the intermediary holding company be 
subject to CGT on a deemed disposal this would 
prove to be limiting on the commercial rationale of 
future restructuring or relocation decisions.  
A crucial consideration in establishing an intermediary 
company would therefore be whether or not the potential 
jurisdiction imposes actual or deemed CGT. Ideally the 
intermediary company should be situated in a jurisdiction 
where the sale transaction is disregarded from a CGT 
perspective. A tax haven or low tax jurisdiction can achieve 
this through either providing a participation exemption in 
respect of the sale of shares or the absence of a CGT 
regime. 
Furthermore, this would be even more beneficial in 
instances where a DTA does exist between the intermediary 
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holding company jurisdiction and the jurisdiction in which 
the subsidiaries of the intermediary holding company are 
situated. In these instances the DTA normally attributes full 
taxing rights to the holding company jurisdiction (i.e. the 
alienator), thereby disregarding the capital gain altogether 
(i.e. full taxing rights are provided to the holding company 
jurisdiction, which in turn does not impose CGT) in the 
hands of the subsidiary company. 
2.5 The absence of tax on an increase in share capital 
Intermediary holding companies are at times established 
through capital funding. If additional funding is required for 
business expansion (e.g. the purchase of additional 
subsidiary companies) the funding can be raised via an 
increase in capital (Olivier & Honiball, 2011). An ideal 
intermediary holding company should therefore be situated 
in a jurisdiction that caters for such expansion. Where tax is 
levied on an increase in share capital, this would not cater 
for such transactions.  
2.6 The absence of transfer pricing regulations  
In a group company context, it may be more beneficial to 
use the availability of group services as opposed to third 
party services. This would allow the profit to remain within 
the group and to simultaneously shift funds to the parent 
company. The absence of transfer pricing regulations 
allows for companies to determine the price of the goods or 
services depending on where the profit is most beneficial. 
The most beneficial jurisdiction may depend on a number 
of factors including an analysis of which jurisdiction 
applies the lowest tax rate etc.  
This treatment is only possible where an absence of transfer 
pricing policies exist.   
Thin capitalisation rules are generally applied 
internationally in instances where the funding is obtained 
from connected persons. This regime has been developed to 
ensure that funds are not shifted through the use of 
excessive interest or obtained at a much lower cost than it 
would have been obtained at had it been received from a 
third party.  
The absence of thin capitalisation rules would allow for the 
intermediary company to obtain funding at a much lower 
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cost than what would have been received from a third party 
(such as a bank). Alternatively, the interest payments may 
also be used to shift funds to the parent company in the 
form of excessive payments.   
2.7 The absence of a controlled foreign company 
regime 
Controlled foreign company (CFC) legislation has been 
introduced in various jurisdictions. This legislation provides 
that where more than 50% shareholding is held in a foreign 
company, the taxable income of the foreign company must 
be calculated as if the company was situated in the 
shareholders jurisdiction. This regime is normally 
accompanied by exemptions. These exemptions range from 
a blanket exemption where the company is situated in a 
high tax paying jurisdiction to specific exemptions where 
there is enough substance situated in the country.    
A good intermediary holding company regime would either 
provide enough exemptions to allow for the CFC’s to 
accumulate profit without a risk of double tax on the profits 
(i.e. in both the CFC jurisdiction and the intermediary 
holding company jurisdiction), or to not impose a CFC 
regime.  
2.8 The optimisation of foreign tax credits 
Foreign tax credits can be optimised through what is 
referred to as “pooling of funds” (Olivier & Honiball, 
2011). Pooling of funds means that income from a high tax 
jurisdiction (with a large tax credit) and income from a low 
tax jurisdiction (with a limited tax credit) is earned by the 
same jurisdiction to allow for the high tax credit to be 
utilised against the limited tax credit, thereby increasing the 
average tax credit utilised.  
 
As this treatment is prohibited by many jurisdictions 
(through various restrictions on how the tax credit may be 
claimed), the use of an intermediate holding company may 
facilitate the MNE to achieve this optimisation of the 
foreign tax credits. 
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2.9 The ability to undertake group reorganisations and 
asset protection  
Many companies select an intermediary holding company 
jurisdiction based on commercial rationale. Two significant 
commercial considerations are (Olivier & Honiball, 2011):  
• the ability to undertake future group reorganisations. 
This would require the intermediary company to be 
established in a jurisdiction where there is more 
flexibility around both group tax regulations and 
company legislation; and 
• the establishment of asset protection in a politically 
safe jurisdiction.  
2.10 Reduction of foreign exchange gains or losses 
Where an intermediary company is established in a 
jurisdiction with a different functional currency to the 
subsidiary company, a foreign exchange gain or loss will be 
recognised on the difference between the two currency 
values. This foreign exchange translation may result in a 
large taxable profit or loss. A few head quarter company 
regimes offer the alternative of establishing an intermediary 
holding company in the functional currency used by the 
subsidiary companies. This would eliminate any foreign 
exchange fluctuations, as the intermediary holding 
company will be able to operate in the same currency as the 
subsidiary.  
2.11 The absence of an exchange control regime 
Many countries enforce what is known as an exchange 
control regime. This regime requires that the investor would 
need to apply for approval in order to invest funds outside 
of the country. Certain limitations are imposed on the 
amounts that may be invested outside the country.  An 
intermediary holding company that is established in a 
jurisdiction situated outside of an exchange control area, 
would be able to facilitate the re-investment of funds (as 
either debt or equity) by the MNE, without the risk of 
forced repatriation or the trapping of funds within a specific 
exchange control area (Olivier & Honiball, 2011). This 
would enable to MNE to operate and expand more freely.  
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2.12 Conclusion  
An ideal holding company jurisdiction should be 
established in a jurisdiction that provides the following 
characteristics:  
• A low corporate tax rate to allow for any income 
earned from the foreign investments in the form of 
interest, royalties or management fees to be taxed at 
a minimal rate;  
• A exemptions in respect of certain types of income, 
such as dividends;  
• A wide network of DTAs should also be present to 
limit the withholding taxes imposed by the 
investment jurisdictions; 
• No or limited withholding taxes to avoid double 
taxation on the same income streams;  
• Lack of a transfer-pricing and thin capitalisation 
regime to allow for the repatriation of funds without 
limitation;  
• Lack of a CFC regime to avoid the imputation of 
foreign income earned back to the intermediary 
company;  
• Lack of a CGT regime must exist to allow for future 
tax free sale of investments and restructurings based 
on commercial rationale;  
• Flexibility around group and company tax and other 
legislation to allow for the easy reorganisation of 
assets;  
• The ability to transact in a functional currency other 
than the local currency to minimise foreign 
exchange gains and losses; 
• Lack of an exchange control regime to allow for the 
reinvestment of funds offshore without restrictions.  
 
National Treasury took these characteristics into 
consideration in establishing the new HQCR and 
endeavoured to ensure that these characteristics were met in 
terms of section 9I. 
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3. Chapter 3: The new South African headquarter 
company regime 
During the 2010 Budget Speech, the Minister of Finance, Pravin 
Gordhan, announced the introduction of the new HQCR. 
Olivier and Honiball (2011) identified that this was not South 
Africa’s first attempt at introducing this type of incentive for 
foreign investors. In 2002 to 2004 the first attempt at an IHCR was 
established, but has subsequently been abolished due to its 
ineffectiveness. The IHCR was targeted at companies that were 
defined in section 1 of the Act as an international headquarter or 
intermediary company. The use of this regime was governed by 
limiting the application thereof to companies that were defined as 
such by meeting all of the below requirements: 
• 100% of the equity was to be held by a non-resident;  
• share capital may not have been directly or indirectly held 
by a resident or a resident trust;  
• 90% of the value of such a company must have been 
attributed to investments in share capital or loans in 
subsidiaries; and  
• at least 50% of the beneficial interest in the subsidiary 
companies is to be held. 
This regime provided the incentives below to non-resident 
companies by (Olivier & Honiball, 2011): 
• Excluding the International Headquarter Company (IHQC) 
from the definition of a South African tax resident. 
Consequently the provisions applying to South African 
residents were not applicable to the IHQ by virtue of the 
fact that the IHQC was not a resident. One of the provisions 
that would not have therefore applied to the IHQC was the 
CFC regime detailed under section 9D of the Act. This 
allowed the IHQC to invest through South Africa without 
any risk of double taxation through the imputation of the 
foreign income in the South Africa taxable income under 
section 9D of the Act. Similar, this would also mean that 
any provisions relating to transfer pricing and thin 
capitalisation would not apply to the IHQC.  
• Exchange Control regulations are only imposed in South 
Africa on South African residents. As the IHQC was 
considered to be a non-resident company, these regulations 
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would therefore not have imposed borrowing restrictions on 
connected person transactions to and from non-residents.  
This regime was abolished due to its lack of sought after 
characteristics that are normally associated with an IHQC. National 
Treasury had identified that the principal difficulties with this 
regime were that (Olivier & Honiball, 2011): 
• South African resident companies were excluded from 
using the IHCR;  
• An increased corporate tax rate of 33% applied to South 
African sourced income earned by an IHQC as opposed to 
the local tax rate of 29% (at the time). 
• The treaty benefits that were available to a South African 
resident company were not available to the IHQC as DTAs 
are generally only applicable to residents of a contracting 
state;  
• Although the IHQC was not subject to CGT on 
conventional disposals (as a result of the non-resident 
classification), the IHQC would still have been subject to 
CGT on immovable property held in South Africa. 
Furthermore, at the time that the IHQC was in existence, 
the CGT rate applicable to non-residents on the sale of 
immovable property in South Africa was applied at a higher 
rate than it would have been, had the company been a South 
African resident company. Non-resident companies with 
branches established in South Africa were previously 
subject to tax a rate of 33%. The IHQC would therefore 
have been taxed at a rate of 50% * 33% on the sale of 
immovable property in South Africa.  Dependant on the 
value of the sale, this may be significantly more when 
compared to the rate that an incorporated resident company 
would be subject to 50% * 29% (i.e. the corporate rate at 
the time the IHCR existed); 
• The IHCR did not provide any tax incentives other than 
what a non-resident company was already entitled to by 
virtue of the fact that non-resident companies are only taxed 
on locally sourced income. 
The Act did however provide for the IHQC to use a few of the 
benefits applicable to defined non-resident companies:  
• Section 10(1)(k) previously provided for an exemption in 
respect of foreign dividend income received;  
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• No dividend withholding tax existed during the time of 
implementation. 
When establishing the new South African HQCR, National 
Treasury considered all of the concerns previously encountered 
with the IHCR and attempted to mitigate these problem areas 
(Mvovo, 2012).  
The new South Africa HQCR is detailed under section 9I of the 
Act and was predominantly introduced to cater for the most 
commonly used Headquarter structures.  
3.1 Traditional headquarter structure 
In an interview with a representative from the National 
Treasury, Lutando Mvovo (2012), it was identified that the 
new South African HQCR was established with a view to 
address the following types of structures. Each structure 
was considered with specific requirements relating to that 
scenario. 











National Treasury (Mvovo, 2012)identified a traditional 
headquarter company as an offshore company that wishes to 
invest into various sub-Saharan Africa subsidiaries. This 
structure is catered for through the establishment of a South 
African Headquarter Company (HQC). It is envisioned that the 
South African HQC will own the shares and the substantial 
holdings in the African subsidiaries.. The South African HQC 
Offshore	  European	  
Company	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is to have managers and financial advisors that are dedicated to 
managing the regional group. In certain instances, the foreign 
investor will advance funds to the new South African HQC, to 
facilitate funding to the subsidiary companies (Mvovo, 2012).   
In order for this structure to prove beneficial, the regime must 
provide the following characteristics: 
• The lack of exchange control in order  
-­‐ to pass the funds from the foreign parent company to 
the African subsidiaries without the need for 
exchange control approval; and 
-­‐ to enable any growth on the South African investment 
to be freely invested offshore.  
• The lack of CFC regulations to avoid the double taxation 
of the African subsidiaries under both the South African 
CFC regime and the CFC regime of the offshore investor 
(i.e. the ultimate parent company).  
• The lack of thin capitalisation rules to enable the offshore 
investor to provide funding to the structure. 




































Subsidiary	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An offshore company wishes to invest into sub-Saharan 
African via a new South African HQC. Further to this, a South 
African Holding Company is established to act as a holding 
company for South African businesses.  
Similar to Structure 1 above, the new South African HQC will 
have managers and financial advisors that are dedicated to 
managing the regional group. In certain instances, the foreign 
investor will advance funds to the new South African HQC, to 
facilitate funding to the subsidiary companies (Mvovo, 2012). 
Consideration was given to the fact that the implementation of 
this structure will result in:  
• the South African subsidiary companies being fully 
taxable under the South African corporate tax regime at a 
rate of 28%; and 
• the South African Holding Company and South African 
subsidiaries would be subject to the exchange control 
regime imposed in South Africa.  
National Treasury confirmed that the following characteristics 
will only apply to the new South African HQC, and not to the 
South African Holding Company:  
• the lack of exchange control in order:  
-­‐ - to pass the funds from the foreign parent 
company to the African subsidiaries without the 
need for exchange control approval; and 
-­‐ - reinvest any capital growth earned on the 
foreign subsidiary companies offshore.  
• the lack of CFC regulations to avoid the double 
taxation of the African subsidiaries under both the 
South African CFC regime and the CFC regime of the 
foreign investor (i.e. the parent company).  
• the lack of thin capitalisation rules to enable the 
offshore investor to provide funding to the structure. 
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National Treasury identified the typical private equity 
investments that are established (Mvovo, 2012). This type 
of private equity fund operates as a limited partnership (en 
commandite). The investors seek to place investments in a 
South African equity fund, that is dedicated to the African 
region. The fund managers are general partners and the 
investors are considered to be the limited partners. The 
funds are dedicated to a 20%: 80% respective investment 
into South Africa and sub-Saharan operations (Mvovo, 
2012).  Presently a dual structure is utilised, whereby the 
sub-Saharan investments are managed through a tax haven 
and the South African investments are managed through a 
private equity fund dedicated to local investments (Mvovo, 
2012).  
In order for the regime to be considered effective, the 
private equity fund would have to be free from:  
• exchange control regulations to enable the private 
equity fund to on pass the financing received from the 
foreign investors through to the African subsidiaries 
without the need for Exchange Control approval;  
• exchange control regulations on any growth in the 
South African fund to enable further offshore 
investment without restrictions; and 
• being considered a permanent establishment in South 
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A South African MNE owns various local and foreign 
subsidiaries. The MNE’s foreign operations are typically 
held through an intermediary holding company that is 
situated in a foreign (i.e. a non-South African jurisdiction). 
This allows for the pooling of offshore funds in a 
jurisdiction that is free from exchange control.  
In order to be considered as an effective regime, the new 
South African HQC regime must cater for the funds to 
accumulate in the new South African HQC as if it was an 
offshore company. This would enable the reinvestment of 
any future growth on the funds without restrictions (i.e. no 
exchange control).. 





A South African financing company provides financing to 
independent MNE (i.e. to the South African branch of the 
MNE). Due to the lack of funds (in the South African 
financing company) the South African company acts as an 
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   SA	  Branch	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intermediary company (i.e. the South African company 
borrows funds from international financing companies and 
on lends these funds).  
Section 9I of the Act was introduced in order to provide for 
these circumstances and allow for the funds to be reinvested 
offshore without exchange control approval. 
3.2 Section 9I – Headquarter Company definition 
Section 9I of the Act determines that certain requirements 
that must be met in order to be classified as an HQC under 
the new HQCR. These requirements are laid out as follows: 
• The company must be a South African resident (this 
is not the case where a DTA deems the company to 
be resident of another jurisdiction); 
• 80% of the total assets in the current and all 
previous years (excluding cash or deposits payable 
on demand) must be attributed to:  
-­‐ Debt to a foreign subsidiary company in 
which the new South African HQC held at 
least 10% of the equity shares and voting 
rights; or 
-­‐ IP licensed to a foreign subsidiary company 
in which the new South African HQC holds 
at least 10% of the equity shares and voting 
rights; or 
-­‐ An investment in equity shares in a foreign 
company in which the new South African 
HQC held at least 10% of the equity shares 
and voting rights; and 
• In the year in which the company elects to be treated 
as a new South African HQC, each shareholder must 
hold at least 10% of the equity shares and voting 
rights. If the company is part of a group of 
companies, the total group holding must be 
aggregated in determining the total shareholding 
(Haupt, 2013); and 
• If the gross income exceeds R 5 million, at least 
50% of the gross income must be attributed to; 
-­‐ Dividends, interest, royalties or services 
fees paid by the foreign companies 
identified above; or   
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-­‐ Proceeds from the disposal of interest in the 
companies identified above or IP in the 
companies identified above.  
Should these requirements be met, a company may be 
classified as a new South African HQC if the company has 
made such an election in that year of assessment. Should 
this election be made, the specific legislation applicable to a 
Headquarter Company would apply and provide the 
benefits below to that company.  
3.3 Characteristics of the new South Africa HQCR 
The new HQCR has been established to address both tax 
and commercial considerations. Below, this report 
considers both of these areas.  
3.3.1 Tax considerations  
a. Corporate tax rate: Dividend and other income 
earned under the new HQC Regime 
In terms of Section 9I of the Act a new HQC is 
regarded as a South African resident company.  South 
African legislation dictates that a South African 
resident company will be subject to the corporate tax 
rate of 28%. Any income earned by the new HQC will 
therefore be subject to tax at this rate unless an 
exemption applies. Foreign dividend income is 
considered to be exempt income under section 10B of 
the Act, which determines that there: 
 
(2) Must be exempt from normal tax any foreign dividend 
received by or accrued to a person  
(a)  if that person holds at least 10% of the total equity shares 
and voting rights of the company declaring the foreign 
dividend. 
 
Section 10B of the Act defines a foreign dividend as:  
 
• Any foreign dividend as defined in Section 1:  
any amount that is paid or payable by a foreign 
company in respect of a share in that foreign company 
where that amount is treated as a dividend or similar 
payment by that foreign company for the purposes of 
the laws relating to –  
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(a)  tax on income on companies of that country 
in which that foreign company has a place of 
effective management; or  
(b)  companies of the country in which that 
foreign company is incorporated, formed or 
established, where the country in which that 
foreign company has it place of effective 
management does not have any applicable 
laws relating to tax on income,  
But does not include any amounts so paid or payable 
that –  
(i) constitutes a redemption of a participatory 
interest in an arrangement or scheme 
contemplated in paragraph (e)(ii) of the 
definition of “company”. 
 
• dividend paid or declared by a headquarter company.  
 
If the HQC should receive foreign dividends from a 
company in which it owns at least 10% of the equity 
share, the dividend income will be considered to be 
exempt. Similarly an exemption also exists under 
Section 10B of the Act in respect of dividend paid by 
the new HQC to its South African shareholders 
(provided that the South African shareholders own at 
least 10% of the total equity shares and voting rights.  
The Act does not provide for an exemption in terms of 
interest, management fee or royalty income, and any 
income of this nature will be considered taxable at a 
rate of 28%.  
b. Exemption from withholding taxes on interest and 
services 
At present, withholding taxes are only levied on royalty 
and dividend payments made to non-resident 
companies. This will however be amended with the 
introduction of withholding tax on interest and 
management fee payments made to non-residents in 
sections 50 to 51 of the Act. The withholding tax to be 
levied on interest is deemed to come into effect in 
respect of interest payments made on or after the 1st 
January 2015 and in respect of management fee 
payments made on or after the 1st January 2016.  
A HQC is exempt from the levying of withholding 
taxes on interest, royalties and service fees paid to a 
non-resident.  
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c.  South African DTAs 
An ideal jurisdiction in which to establish a HQC 
would provide a large treaty network. This 
characteristic is prevalent in South Africa, as South 
Africa has established one of the largest available 
treaty networks. This is can be seen from the large 
number of DTAs that have been signed between South 
Africa and other jurisdictions. A review of the below 
DTA network illustrates that South Africa has entered 
into many DTAs that are not available under other 
prominent headquarter company regimes in other 
jurisdictions, thereby enabling a reduction in some 
local withholding taxes. 
 
The total number of DTAs signed and under 
negotiation is 90. These DTAs are identified as (South 
African Revenue Service, 2014):  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Local	  rates	  agreed	  to	  (Ernst	  and	  Young,	  2014)	  and	  (Deloitte,	  2014).	  DTA	  rates	  agreed	  to	  
(South	  African	  Revenue	  Service,	  2014)	  
2	  In	  specific	  instances	  relating	  to	  financial	  institutions	  and	  local	  authorities	  	  











1 Algeria Local  15% 10% 24% 20% 
DTA 10% if ≥25% 
shareholding/15
% 
10% 10% Taxable in hands 
of alienator (i.e. 






2 Australia Local 30% - unfranked 
0% - Franked 
10% 30% 30% 










property or PE 
3 Austria Local 25% 0% on 20% 25% 
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intercompan
y loans 
DTA 5% if ≥ 25% 
shareholding 
otherwise 15% 




property or PE 
4 Bangladesh Local 20% 10% 10% 15% 
DTA Under negotiation  
5 Belarus Local 12% 10% 15% 12% 
DTA 5% if ≥  25% 
shareholding 
otherwise 15% 










property or  PE 
6 Belgium Local 25% 25% 25% 33% or 0.412% 
on shares if the 
dividend 
requirement is 
met or 25.75% on 




DTA 5% if ≥ 25% 
shareholding 
otherwise 15% 




property or PE 
7 Botswana Local 7.5% 15% 15% 22% 
DTA 10% if ≥ 25% 
shareholding 
otherwise 15% 




property or PE 
8 
 
Brazil Local 0% 15% or 25% 
if tax haven 
15% or 
25% if tax 
15% 








DTA 10% if ≥ 25% 
shareholding 
otherwise 15% 
15% 15% - 
trademarks
; 10% 




property or PE 









DTA 5%≥ 25% 
shareholding 
otherwise 15% 








property or PE 
10 Cameroon Local 16.5% 16.5% 15% 38.5% 
DTA Under negotiation  
11 Canada Local 25% 25% 25% 20% - 31% 
dependant on 
state 










6% - IP; 
10% 




property or PE 





DTA Signed but not ratified 
13 China Local 10% 10% 10% 25% 
DTA 5%    
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14 Croatia Local 12% 15% 15% 20% 






5% Alienator state 
unless 
immovable 
property or PE  
15 Cuba Local 0% EAC 0% EAC 30% EAC 35% 
DTA Under Negotiation  
16 Cyprus Local 0% 0% 0% 20% 
DTA 0% recipient 









property or PE 
17 Czech 
Republic 
Local 15%/35% no 
DTA 
15% or 35% 
if no DTA 
exists 
15% or  









10% Alienator state 
unless 
immovable 







Local 20% 20% 20% 35% 
DTA 5%≥ 25% 
shareholding 
otherwise15% 




property or PE or 
shares in a 
property 
company 
19 Denmark Local 27% 25% 25% 25% 











	   36	  




20 Egypt Local 0% 20% 20% As corporate 
profit:  




DTA 15% 12% 15% Taxed where the 
income is 
sourced unless 
fixed property or 
PE 
21 Ethiopia  Local 10% 10% 5%-8% 15% or 30% on 
company shares 
sale 
DTA 10% 8% 20% Alienator state 
unless 
immovable 








met or 18.38% 
if the shares 
constitute 
investment 
assets and < 
10% 
shareholding 
exists for EU 
companies 
otherwise 24.5% 
24.5% 24.5% 24.5% 
DTA 5%≥ 10% 0% recipient 0% Alienator state 
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shareholding 
otherwise 15% 







































property or PE 





10% 10% 35% 
DTA Signed but not ratified  
25 Germany  Local  25% reduced to 





0% 15% 15% 
DTA 7.5%≥ 25% 
shareholding 
otherwise15% 




Taxable in hands 
of alienator 
unless fixed 
property or PE 
26 Ghana Local 8% 8% 10% 15% 
DTA 5%≥ 10% 
shareholding 
otherwise15% 
10% 10% Alienator state 
unless 
immovable 
property or PE or 
shares in 
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3	  (PKF,	  2013)	  
4	  A	  proclamation	  was	  signed	  between	  Grenada	  and	  the	  UK	  in	  1960.	  All	  provisions	  still	  
refer	  to	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  Therefore	  local	  rates	  have	  been	  quoted.	  	  
immovable 
property 
27 Greece Local 10% 33% 25% 20% 
DTA 5%≥  25% 
shareholding 
otherwise 15% 
8% 5% to 7% Alienator state 
unless 
immovable 
property or PE 
28 Granada 3Local 0% 15% 15% 0% 
DTA 4 0% 15% 15% 0% 
29 Hong Kong Local 0% 0% 4.9% or 
16.5% if 







DTA Under Negotiation  
30 Hungary  Local 0% 0% 0% 19% or 10% if 
less than HUF 50 
million 











property or PE 
31 India Local Dividend 
distribution tax 
(DDT) 16.995% 
20% 25% 10% 
DTA 10% 10% 10% Alienator state 
unless 
immovable 
property or PE or 
shares in 
immovable 
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5	  (Iranian	  Ministry	  of	  Economic	  Affairs	  and	  Finance,	  2014)	  
property 
32 Indonesia Local 20% 20% 20% 20% 
DTA 10% ≥ 10% 
shareholding 
otherwise 15% 




property or PE 
33 Iran5  Local 3% 3% 3% 25% 




property or PE 
34 Ireland Local 20% 20% 20% 33% 











property or PE 
35 Isle of Man Local  0% 0% 0% 0% 
DTA Under Negotiation  




15% to 25% 
depending 
on the type 
of loan 
25% At local rate of 
26.5% 






property or PE 
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property or PE 
38 Japan Local 20% 0% 20% 25.5% 
DTA 5%≥ 25% 
shareholding/15
% 




property or PE 
39 Kenya Local 10% 15% 20% 0% 
DTA Signed not ratified 
40 Korea Local 0% 14% 0% 22% 
DTA 5%≥ 25% 
shareholding/15
% 




property or PE 
41 Kuwait Local 15% 0% 0% 15% 









property or PE 
42 Lesotho Local 25% 25% 25% 25% 
DTA 15% 10% 10%  
43 Luxembourg  Local 15% 15% 0% 21% 















property or PE 
44 Malawi Local 10% 20% 20% 30% to 35% 
DTA No provision in 
DTA. Domestic 








No provision in 
DTA. Domestic 
rate will apply.   
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rate will 




Malaysia Local 0% 15% 10% 15% 
DTA 5% ≥ 25% 
shareholding 
otherwise10% 




property or PE 
46 Malta Local 0% 0% 0% 35% 
DTA 5% if ≥ 10% 
shareholding 
otherwise 10% 




property or PE 
47 Mauritius Local 0% 15% 15% NA 
DTA 5%≥ 10% 
shareholding 
otherwise 15% 
0% 0% 0% 
48 Mexico Local 0% 30% 30% 30% 
DTA 5%> 10% 
shareholding 
/10% 




property or PE 
49 Morocco  Local 10% 10% 10% 30% 
DTA Under Negotiation 
50 Mozambique Local 10% - listed 
otherwise 20% 
20% 20% 32% 
DTA 8% if ≥ 25% 
shareholding  
otherwise15% 




property or PE 
51 Namibia Local 10%≥ 25% 10% 10.2% 0% 
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shareholding 
otherwise 20% 
DTA 5%≥ 10% 
shareholding 
otherwise 15% 
10% 10% 0% 
52 Netherlands Local 15% 0% 0% 25% 














property or PE 
53 New Zealand Local 30% 15% 15% 0% 





10% 10% Taxable in both 
states  
54 Nigeria Local  10% 10% 10% 10% 
DTA 7.5%≥ 10% 
shareholding 
otherwise 10% 




property or PE 
55 Norway Local 25% 0% 0% 28% 














property or PE 

















property or PE 
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57 Pakistan Local 10% 10% 15% 35% 
DTA 10% ≥ 10% 
shareholding 
otherwise 15% 




property or PE 
58 Poland Local 19% 20% 20% 19% 
DTA 5%> 15% 
shareholding 
otherwise 15% 




property or PE 








property or PE 
60 Qatar Local 5% to 7% 5% to 7% 5% to 7%  10% 
DTA Under negotiation  




property or PE 
Local 16% 16% 16% 16% 
62 Russian 
Federation  
Local 15% 20% 20% Taxable as 
corporate 
DTA 10% if ≥30% 
shareholding 




10% 0% (Taxed 
in 
recipient 
state only)  
NA 
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63 Rwanda Local  15% 15% 15% 30% 
DTA 10%≥ 25% 
shareholding 
otherwise20% 
10% 10% Alienator state 
unless PE or 
immovable 
property 






10% 10% Alienator state 
unless PE or 
immovable 
property 
65 Senegal Local 10% 16% 20% 25% 
DTA Under Negotiation  
66 Serbia Local 20% 20% 20% 15% 
DTA Under negotiation  
67 Seychelles Local 15% 15% 15% 0% 




7.5% 10%  
68 Sierra Leone Local 15% 15% 15% 0% 
DTA Dividend paid 
by SA to Sierra 




may not apply 
as the 
proclamation 






NA – local 
rates apply 
NA – local 
rates apply  
NA – local rates 
apply 
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a republic.  
69 Singapore Local  0% 15% 10% 0% 
DTA 5%≥ 10% 
shareholding 
otherwise 15% 














71 Spain Local 21%  21% 24.75% 30% corporate 
tax rate with a 
12% credit 
DTA 5% ≥25% 
shareholding 
otherwise 15% 
5% 5% Alienator state 
unless PE or 
immovable 
property 
72 Sri Lanka Local 10% 10% 10% 0% 
DTA Under negotiation  
73 Sudan Local 0% 7% 15% 2% to 5% 
DTA Signed not ratified  
74 Swaziland Local 15% 10% 15% 0% 
DTA 10% ≥ 25% 
shareholdings 
otherwise 15% 
10% 10% 0% 
75 Sweden Local 30% 0% 0% 22% 










unless PE or 
immovable 
property 
76 Switzerland Local 35% 0% 0% 0% 





unless PE or 
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otherwise 15% state only) immovable 
property 
77 Syria Local 0%  7% 7.5% 
DTA Under Negotiation  
78 Taiwan Local 20% 20%  20% 17% 
DTA 5%≥ 10% 
shareholding; 
15% 
10% 10%  Alienator state 
unless PE or 
immovable 
property 
79 Tanzania Local 5%: listed  
10%: unlisted 
10% 15% 30% 
 10% if > 15% 
ownership exists  
otherwise 20% 
10% 10% Alienator state 
unless PE or 
immovable 
property 
80 Thailand Local  10% 15% 15% 20% 




15% 15% Alienator state 
unless PE or 
immovable 
property. Shares 
are taxable in 
both states. 
81 Tunisia Local 0% 20% 15% 30% 
DTA 10% 5% Banks  
12% 
10% Alienator state 
unless PE or 
immovable 
property 
82 Turkey Local 15% 15% 20% 20% 
DTA 10% ≥25% 
shareholding 
otherwise 15% 
10% 10% Alienator state 




held <1 year. 
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Then taxable in 
other state. 
83 Uganda Local 15% 15% 15% 30% 




10% 10%  
84 Ukraine Local 15% 15% 15% 19% 
DTA 5% ≥20% 
shareholding; 
15% 
10% 10% Alienator state 
unless PE or 
immovable 
property 
85 United Arab 
Emirates 
Local 0% 0% 0% 0% 
DTA Under negotiation  
86 United 
Kingdom 
Local 0% 20% 20% 24% 
DTA 5% if ≥ 10% 
shareholding; 













unless PE or 
immovable 
property 
87 United States 
of America 
Local 30% 30% 30% 35% 











unless PE or 
immovable 
property 
88 Vietnam Local  0% 5% 10% 25% 
DTA Under negotiation  
89 Zambia Local 15% 15% 20% 0% 
DTA 15% 15% 20% 0% 
90 Zimbabwe Local  10% if listed 15% 15% 1% listed shares; 
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The application of the DTAs in respect of foreign 
transactions is not however only limited to the new 
South African HQC. South African resident companies 
are also entitled to apply these DTAs to transactions 
with other jurisdictions.  
d. CGT and the new HQCR 
An intermediary or head quarter company frequently 
purchases new investments in subsidiary companies 
and sells off non-profitable investments. Should the 
company be situated in a jurisdiction that imposes a tax 
on capital gains, this would give rise to CGT. One of 
the reasons that the Department of National Treasury 
considers South Africa to be an ideal holding company 
regime is attributed to the disregarding of capital gains 
on a disposal under paragraph 64B of the Eighth 
Schedule to the Act. This exclusion is further extended 
to specifically disregard any capital gains made by the 
new South African HQC in paragraph 64B(2) of the 
Eighth Schedule to the Act which states that:  
 
Subject to subparagraph (4), a headquarter company must 
disregard any capital gain or capital loss determined in 
respect of the disposal of any equity share in any foreign 
company (other than an interest contemplated in paragraph 
2(2)) if that headquarter company (whether alone or together 
with any other person forming part of the same group of 
companies as that headquarter company) immediately before 
that disposal held at least 10 per cent of the equity shares and 
voting rights in that foreign company. 
 
Should a non-resident shareholder choose to sell off 
certain of the investments held by the new HQC, the 
sale would be free from CGT if at least 10% of the 




shares or 15% for 
immovable 
property 
DTA 15% 15% 20% N/A 
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It is noted however, that in instances where a South 
African company enters into the new HQCR, a deemed 
disposal will occur and give rise to CGT as determined 
in section 9H of the Act through the provision of the 
following wording in the Act: 
Where, during any year of assessment or foreign tax year of a 
company, the company ceases to be a resident, becomes a 
headquarter company or ceases to be a controlled foreign 
company as contemplated in paragraph (a), that company 
must be treated as having- 
i)disposed of each of that company's assets on the date 
immediately before the day on which that company so 
ceased to be a resident, became a headquarter company or 
ceased to be a controlled foreign company for an amount 
received or accrued equal to the market value of that asset 
on that date; and 
ii)reacquired each of those assets on the day on which that 
company so ceased to be a resident, became a headquarter 
company or ceased to be a controlled foreign company at 
an expenditure equal to the market value contemplated in 
sub paragraph (i). 
 
Certain assets, such as assets relating to a permanent 
establishment or immoveable property are excluded 
from this deemed disposal due to the fact that it will 
remain taxable in South Africa as a result of source 
rules. The levying of this deemed CGT would make it 
difficult for an already established South African 
company to enter into the new South African HQCR.  
e. Tax on the increase of share capital 
Capital duty is not imposed in South Africa on the 
increase of share capital. Where funding is raised by 
means of additional share capital, this increased funding 
will not be subject to tax. South Africa therefore appears 
to be suitably equipped to promote additional investment 
in the form of share capital.  
 
f. Transfer pricing legislation in respect of a HQC  
In order to avoid non-market related prices from being 
imposed between connected persons, the Act imposes a 
transfer pricing and thin capitalisation regime under 
section 31 of the Act. Section 31(5) provides that the 
transfer pricing legislation does not apply if:  
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• Financial assistance has been received by the new 
South African HQC from a non-resident 
company and is applied to a foreign subsidiary 
company in which the new South African HQC 
owns at least 10% of the equity shares or voting 
rights; or 
• Where financial assistance has been granted by 
the new South African HQC to a foreign 
company in which it owns at least 10% of the 
equity shares or voting rights; or 
• A transaction that has been entered into between 
the new South African HQC and another foreign 
company in respect of which the foreign 
company has provided the use, right of use or 
permission to use IP (as defined in section 23I of 
the Act) to the new South African HQC, and the 
new South African HQC in turn grants the use, 
right of use or permission to use the IP to a 
foreign company in which it holds at least 10% of 
the equity shares and voting rights (provided that 
the new South African HQC does not make use 
of the IP otherwise); or  
• A transaction has been entered into between the 
new South African HQC and a foreign company 
in which at least 10% of the equity shares or 
voting rights is held, and the transaction provides 
that the foreign company may have right of use, 
permission to use, or may have been granted use 
of any IP (as defined in section 23I of the Act).  
 
The new South African HQCR is therefore ideally suited 
to facilitate funding by an offshore investor that is on-
passed to the foreign subsidiaries. Similarly, funding 
provided by a new South African HQC to foreign 
subsidiaries (that was not received from an offshore 
investor) will also not be subject to the thin capitalisation 
and transfer pricing legislation.  
 
In contradiction to the above relaxation of transfer 
pricing and thin capitalisation rules, legislation has also 
introduced a limitation under section 20C of the Act 
(South African Revenue Service, 1962) on the deduction 
relating to royalty and IP payments.  
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Section 20C determines that the interest and royalty 
payments made in respect of IP services and financial 
assistance to a shareholder is only deductible to the 
extent of the income earned from on passing these 
services to the subsidiary companies, in which at least a 
10% of the equity shares and voting rights is held.  
 
The relaxation of transfer pricing and thin capitalisation 
regime does not provide relief in practice as the Act 
continues to impose a limitation on the deductibility of 
interest and royalty payments.  In addition to this, the 
relaxation, if the regime does not extend to transactions 
such as the sale of goods and services, and any such 
transactions would still be subject to the transfer pricing 
regime on the difference in price between the market 
value and the transaction price. Should a price difference 
exist on these transactions, this would be considered to 
be a loan on which the South African Revenue Service 
(‘SARS’) may levy a market related interest rate (Haupt, 
2013).   
g. The CFC regime under South African legislation  
The CFC regime under section 9D of the Act 
determines that the net income of a CFC must be 
imputed into the taxable income of the South African 
parent company as if the CFC is considered to be a 
resident company of South Africa. This inclusion is 
subject to certain exclusions. The net income is 
calculated under the provisions detailed in section 
9D(2) of the Act.  Section 9D(2) determines the 
imputed income in the hands of a new South African 
HQC from CFC, to be nil by virtue of the wording:  
There shall be included in the net income for the year of 
assessment of any resident (other than a resident that is a 
headquarter company) who directly or indirectly holds any 
participation rights in a controlled foreign company-  
On the last day of the foreign tax year of that controlled 
foreign company which ends during the year of assessment 
an amount equal to  
Where that foreign company was a controlled foreign 
company for the entire foreign tax year, the proportional 
amount of net income of that controlled foreign company 
determined for that foreign tax year, which bears to the total 
net income of that company during that foreign tax year, the 
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same ratio as the percentage of the participation rights of that 
resident in relation to that company bears to the total 
participation rights in relation to that company on the last 
day.  
Therefore a new South African HQC is not required to 
impute the income earned by the subsidiary companies 
in its calculation of taxable income. 
h. The optimisation of foreign tax credits 
Sections 6quat and 6quin of the Act (South African 
Revenue Service, 1962) allows for a taxpayer to claim 
a foreign tax credit relating to an amount included in 
the taxable income. The Act determines that specific 
provisions must be applied in calculating the allowable 
credit that is limited to,   
• the lower of the South African tax payable; and  
• the actual foreign tax paid on amounts included in 
the South African taxable income of the recipient.  
Tax credits relating to income earned from different 
jurisdictions may be claimed in the same entity, 
however the restrictions imposed on the calculation of 
the claimable credit may make it difficult to “pool” 
funds in South Africa.  
3.3.2 Commercial considerations 
In consideration of the regular amendments to the 
legislation, Olivier and Honiball (2011) determined that:  
the tax considerations are short-term considerations at best, and 
one should therefore consider the tax considerations in addition to 
the commercial considerations.  
National Treasury considered exactly this, when 
establishing the provisions relating to the new HQC. 
As a consequence the new HQCR was established with the 
commercial considerations in mind, namely the ability to 
undertake both group reorganisations and asset protection, 
and the relaxation of the exchange control regime.   
a. The ability to undertake group reorganisation and 
asset protection 
The Act provides for what is known as corporate 
restructurings within a group context to be completed 
free of tax implications.  These sections of the Act are 
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known as the corporate rules. These provisions 
determine the specific requirements that must be met in 
order for the corporate rules to apply. It is noted that 
these provisions are rather onerous and will only apply 
in apply in very specific circumstances, which may 
make it difficult to effect such transactions.  
Example. If a section 45 restructuring is completed in 
respect of an offshore group, the restructuring must be 
completed on loan account. This loan account is 
deemed to have a base cost of nil and cannot be 
distributed without triggering adverse tax effects (i.e. 
the loan account would have to be repaid in cash).  
Generally, tax havens also allow for the use of such 
rules to “step up the base cost” of the investment to 
reflect a market value. A “step up of the base cost” is 
possible in a tax free environment as the sale 
transaction is entered into on market related terms, with 
no corresponding tax effect (i.e. the new acquisition 
cost will be recorded at market value) This feature is 
not provided for in the new HQCR, as a step up of the 
base cost is not allowed as can be seen above.  
Another significant consideration is to ensure that the 
equity investments are held in a politically safe 
environment in which to conclude business. In an 
interview with a representative from National Treasury 
(Mvovo, 2012) it was identified that a few of the 
potential problems that South Africa may encounter 
with this this regime was:  
• Immigration issues and the related administrative issues: 
Attracting foreign skilled people and the time it takes to 
obtain a work permit or visa, and 
 
• Labour issues: Inflexibility of the labour laws is often 
cited as problematic for doing business in SA by 
imposing a high burden on business management and 
increasing the cost. 
 
These issues may create a lack of confidence in the 
political security of the equity investments held in 
South Africa. This problem is further compounded by 
the fact that South Africa is viewed as a politically 
unstable environment due to the volume of labour and 
other protests.  
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b. Foreign exchange gains or losses  
Section 25D of the Act (South African Revenue 
Service, 1962)dictates the treatment of foreign 
exchange gains and losses relating to the new HQC. 
This section determines how the income and 
expenditure incurred by a new HQC in a different 
function currency must be translated back into Rands 
using the average exchange rate for the year. This 
would result in a taxable foreign exchange gain or loss 
incurred in the new HQC, and does not cater to the 
characteristics required by an intermediary or head 
quarter company. 
c. Exchange Control and the IHC Regime 
The new HQCR has been established to promote the 
use of South Africa as an intermediary jurisdiction in 
which to hold equity investments. One of the key 
considerations identified in assessing the potential 
structures that this regime may potentially be applied 
to, is the freedom to invest without exchange control 
limitation.  The following amendment to the Exchange 
Control Act provides that exchange control regulations 
do not apply in respect of a new South African HQC 
(Mvovo, 2012):  
 
Subject to registration with the Financial Surveillance 
Department for reporting purposes, newly established 
headquarter companies who meet the following shareholding 
and asset criteria may invest offshore without restriction. 
3.4  Conclusions 
In conclusion to the first sub-problem identified, it is 
determined that the new HQCR illustrates a few of the 
characteristics (identified in chapter 2 above) required by 
an ideal intermediary holding company jurisdiction, such 
as a disregard of the withholding taxes levied on non-
residents, a large network of DTAs and a relaxation of the 
exchange control regime. Although the remaining best 
practice characteristics normally illustrated by a 
headquarter company are partially present, restrictions 
have been imposed thereon, which may prove difficult for 
potential investors.  At a high level, the HQCR can be 
summarised as follows: 
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• A corporate tax rate of 28% will apply to income 
earned by the HQC.  If an offshore investor aims to 
only use the HQC as an intermediary company through 
which foreign dividend income is repatriated back to 
the ultimate offshore parent company, this would not 
be a potential problem as dividend income is 
considered to be exempt income in South Africa. This 
exemption will however apply to both South African 
resident companies and to offshore investors that have 
established a new HQC in South Africa.  As no 
exemption is available to in respect of income not of a 
dividend nature, this may prove to be problematic 
where interest and royalty income is repatriated back 
from the foreign subsidiary companies to the new 
HQC. Income of this nature will be taxed at the 
comparatively high corporate tax rate of 28% in South 
Africa. 
• Dividend and royalty payments made to non-resident 
shareholders will be exempt from withholding tax 
under the new HQCR; 
• The Act proposes to provide for an exemption from 
withholding tax on interest and management fee 
payments to non-resident (under the new HQC ) on 
implementation thereof in the future;  
• South Africa has entered into a large number of DTAs 
with other jurisdictions. These DTAs include 
jurisdictions that have not signed DTAs with more 
prominent head quarter company jurisdictions. Where 
these DTAs are found to be comparable to other 
holding company jurisdictions, this will prove to be an 
advantage for an offshore investor looking to invest 
into Africa. These DTAs are however also available to 
a South African resident company transacting with 
other jurisdictions. The DTA will not provide any 
additional benefits to a South African MNE;  
• Paragraph 64B(2) of the Eighth schedule to the Act 
provides for disregarding of capital gains on the sale of 
the investments by a new South African HQC. A 
similar provision is determined under paragraph 64B(1) 
of the Eighth Schedule to the Act in respect of to 
resident companies, although this provision does 
impose certain requirements (example. the purchaser of 
the equity shares must be a non-resident).  This 
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limitation illustrates that there are fewer restrictions 
imposed on a new South African HQC than on a South 
African resident company. The benefits that are only 
provided to the new South African HQC, illustrate that 
the new South African HQCR caters for the best 
practice characteristics that are required in an 
intermediary holding company.      
• Upon entering the new HQCR, section 9H provides 
that a South African company will be subject to a 
deemed sale of assets. This may prove to limit the 
South African companies that would utilise the regime 
and may be seen to mimic the previous IHQ that was 
not aimed as South African companies.  
• Capital duty is not imposed on the increase of share 
capital in South Africa, this would allow for the 
shareholder of the new HQC to invest further capital 
into the new HQC where additional funding is 
required.   
• The new HQC provides for an exemption from the 
transfer pricing and thin capitalisation regime on 
financial assistance and royalty payments to and from 
foreign shareholders or foreign subsidiaries. The Act 
has however provided a limitation on the relaxation of 
these rules by introducing section 20C to the Act. 
Section 20C provides that the deduction relating to 
such expenses is limited to the income earned from the 
supply of these services to foreign company in which at 
least 10% of the equity  shares and voting rights are 
held. Although the provisions relating to transfer 
pricing and thin capitalisation legislation appear to 
have been relaxed, in essence they have just been 
transferred to an alternative section of the Act. In 
addition to this, the relaxation of the transfer pricing 
regime has not been extended to cover sales and 
services transactions due to the fact that the 
intermediary company is not envisioned to received 
this type of income;  
• A new HQC will not be required to impute the income 
earned in the hands of its respective CFC’s back into 
South Africa;  
• South Africa does allow for a deduction or rebate in 
respect of foreign taxes paid. This is however limited to 
the South African tax on the foreign income earned. 
	   57	  
This limitation on the calculation of the credit will 
prove to be a adversity in the maximisation of foreign 
tax credits, as no credit is available if the income is 
exempt;  
• Reorganisation transactions are possible under the 
corporate rules in South Africa. These rules are very 
specific and will only apply in limited circumstances, 
making the application thereof onerous. In a normal 
intermediary or head quarter company jurisdiction one 
is able to utilise these rules to step up the base cost of 
an investment. Under South African legislation this 
would not be possible as the assets are transferred at 
the original cost. This will prove to be a limitation on 
the effectiveness of the new HQCR as;  
-­‐ no certainty exists that the corporate rules will 
apply;  
-­‐ should the corporate rules apply, there would be no 
additional tax benefit in a group reorganisation.  
• The new HQCR does not provide for any relief from 
exchange gains or losses incurred. If the foreign 
subsidiary companies where to transact in a functional 
currency other than Rands, the fluctuating value of the 
Rand on translation would result in a both an additional 
tax and accounting gain or loss.  
• Many investors wish to invest in a jurisdiction that 
provides for freedom to reinvest any growth offshore as 
is best required from a commercial perspective. The 
new HQCR does provide for this by the relaxation of 
the exchange control regulations relating to the new 
HQC. 
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4. Chapter 4: Comparison between South Africa and 
Mauritius as a headquarter company jurisdiction  
Internationally a few foreign jurisdictions have managed to 
successfully establish effective intermediary holding company 
regimes. This chapter considers a well-known jurisdiction (i.e. 
Mauritius) and reviews whether or not the characteristics 
previously identified in Chapter 2 are present in this jurisdiction 
and comparable to the characteristics provided for by the HQCR in 
South Africa as identified in Chapter 3.  
 
Interest is often expressed in Mauritius as an intermediary holding 
company jurisdiction. This is attributed to the good infrastructure, 
and close proximity to Africa, which contributes to ease of 
business.   As a result of these and other characteristics Mauritius 
has been able to provide a good holding company jurisdiction for 
many different types of businesses such as offshore banking and 
business services, insurance services and investment fund 
management. More specifically however, Mauritius also affects 
two different types of offshore holding company regimes, namely 
the Global Business Licence 1 (GBC 1) and the Global Business 
License 2 (GBL 2).  
4.1 Headquarter company regimes in Mauritius  
Mauritius has established a number of regimes that provide 
good opportunities for companies to invest through 
Mauritius into other jurisdictions. These regimes include:  
4.1.1 Global Business License 1 (GBL1)  
The GBL 1 regime caters for foreign investors who wish to 
invest into other jurisdictions through a Mauritian 
intermediary company. In order to establish a GBL1, the 
following requirements must be met: 
• A minimum of two Mauritius directors; 
• The principal bank account must be situated in 
Mauritius;  
• The accounting records must be kept within a 
registered office in Mauritius;  
• The annual financial statements must be prepared and 
audited in Mauritius; and  
• Board meetings with at least two Mauritian directors 
present must be held in Mauritius.  
	   59	  
Under the GBL 1 regime a company is classified as a tax 
resident company and may enter into trading transactions in 
Mauritius. As a Mauritius tax resident, the Mauritian tax 
legislation would apply to the GBC1. 
a. Corporate tax rate: Dividend and other income 
earned 
A corporate tax rate of 15% is levied on the worldwide 
income of a Mauritius tax resident company. 
Conversely to taxing residents on worldwide income, 
Mauritius only taxes non-resident companies (such as a 
GBC2 see below) on Mauritius sourced income 
(Deloitte, 2014a) .The taxable income is calculated on 
the profit earned from trading activities less any 
allowable expenses.  
The Mauritian headquarter company may claim a 
foreign tax credit (FTC) If the underlying shareholding 
in the foreign subsidiary company is 5% or more (Ernst 
and Young, 2014). In addition to this, a deemed FTC 
can also be claimed in respect of a GBC1, this FTC is 
presumed to be 80% of the Mauritius taxes paid. The 
deemed FTC will therefore reduce the corporate 
income tax rate to an effective rate of 3%.   
As mentioned previously, an ideal headquarter 
company regime would allow for the repatriation of 
funds, (such as dividend distributions or payments in 
the form of management fees, interest or royalties) to 
the shareholder without any tax effects. One of the 
methods in which Mauritius allows for this is in the 
form of dividends (Mauritius Revenue Authority, 
1995). Dividend income received from a Mauritian 
company will be tax exempt in the hands of the GBC 1. 
Dividend income received by the GBC 1 from a 
foreign subsidiary company will be taxed as normal 
income at the corporate rate of 15%, but as discussed 
above, the legislation affords the recipient a tax credit 
of 80%.  
Another effective manner of repatriating funds is in the 
form of interest. Interest income received by a 
company is exempt (Mauritius Revenue Authority, 
1995) in certain instances where the amount has been 
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received from a non-resident company that is not 
carrying on business in Mauritius by:  
• a corporation in possession of GBL1 and the interest 
income is paid out of foreign sourced income; or 
• by a bank if the interest arises from transactions with 
non-resident and corporations holding GBL1. 
If none of the above exemptions apply, then the income 
will be subject to tax at the corporate rate of 15%. As 
mentioned previously, this rate will be reduced via a 
deemed foreign tax credit of 80%, and an effective tax 
rate of 3% will apply.  
The same principle would apply in respect of any 
royalty or management fee income earned (i.e. the 
income will be taxable at the effective corporate rate of 
3%). 
b. Exemption from withholding taxes on interest, 
royalties and services 
The Mauritius Revenue Authority ‘MRA’ does not 
impose a dividend withholding tax on payments made 
to non-resident shareholders (Mauritius Revenue 
Authority, 1995).  
On the other hand, should the funds be repatriated to 
non-resident shareholders in the form of interest, 
royalties or management fees, then the MRA will 
impose a withholding tax on these payments at the 
respective rates of 15% on interest and royalty 
payments and 10% on service fee payments made to 
the non-residents respectively. 
c. Withholding tax rates under Mauritius DTAs 
These withholding tax rates can be reduced through the 
application of the DTAs that have been entered into 
between Mauritius and other jurisdictions. Mauritius 
has ratified a total of 39 agreements that are currently 
in force (Mauritius Revenue Authority, 2014a). The 
table below highlights the reduction in the local 
withholding tax rates, but does not address any 
exemptions provided for by the local legislation 
(Deloitte, 2014b).  
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6	  The	  Australia	  DTA	  is	  a	  limited	  DTA	  in	  that	  it	  is	  only	  a	  mutual	  agreement	  procedure	  
document	  in	  respect	  of	  transfer	  pricing.	  
# Jurisdiction Type Dividends Interest Royalties CGT 
1 Australia  Local 0% - Franked  
30%- 
Unfranked 
10% 10% 30% 
DTA6 - - -  
2 Barbados Local 25% (if paid 




15% 15% No specific 
rules. 
DTA 5% 5% 5% Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
3 Belgium Local 25% 25% 25% 33% or 0.412% 
- equity shares 




10% Exempt Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE  
4 Botswana Local 7.5% 15% 15% 22% 
DTA 5%≥ 25% 
shareholding or 
10% (limited to 
the local rate of 
7.5%) 
12% 12.5% Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
5 China Local 10% 10% 10% 25% 
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DTA 5% 10% 10% Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property or 
shares in a 
property 
company 
6 Croatia Local 12% 15% 15% 20% 
DTA Exempt Exempt Exempt Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
7 Cyprus Local 0% 0% 0% 20% 
DTA Exempt Exempt Exempt Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
8 France Local 30% or 50% if 
low tax 
jurisdiction  






n 0% or 
33.3% 
33.3% 






15% Taxed in the 
alienator state 





Local 25% reduced to 
10% under EU 
regime or 15% 
0% 15% 15% 




DTA 5%  ≥  10% 
shareholding 
otherwise 15% 
Exempt 10% Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property or 
shares in a 
property 
company 
10 India Local DDT 16.995% 20% 25% 10% 




rate applies  
15% Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property or 
shares in a 
property 
company 
11 Italy Local 20% 20% 30% 13.67% 





15% Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property or 
shares in a 
property 
company 
12 Kuwait Local 15% 0% 0% 15% 
DTA Exempt Exempt 10% Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
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or immovable 
property or 
shares in a 
property 
company 
13 Lesotho Local 25% 25% 25% 25% 
DTA 10% 10% 10% Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property or 
shares in a 
property 
company 
14 Luxembourg Local 15% 15% 0% 21% 
DTA 5% ≥ 10% 
shareholding 
otherwise 10% 
Exempt Exempt Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property or 
shares in a 
property 
company 
15 Madagascar Local 0% 20% 10% 20% 
DTA 0% 10% 5% Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
16 Malaysia Local Local 0% 15% 10% 
DTA 5% ≥ 10% 
shareholding 
15% 15% Taxed in the 
alienator state 
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7	  (Consulat	  General	  de	  Monaco)	  
8	  (Inland	  Revenue	  Authority	  Nepal:	  Income	  Tax	  Act	  2058,	  2004)	  
9	  (Inland	  Revenue	  Authority	  Nepal,	  2000)	  
otherwise 15% unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
17 Monaco7 Local 0% 0% 0% 0% 
DTA Exempt Exempt Exempt N/A 
 
18 Mozambique Local 10% - listed or 
20% 
20% 20% 32% 




10% < 25% 
shareholding 
by a company  
otherwise 15% 
8% 5% Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
19 Namibia Local 10%≥ 25% 
shareholding or 
20% 
10% 10.2% 0% 
DTA 5%≥ 25% 
shareholding, 
otherwise 10% 
10% 5% Taxed in the  
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
20 Nepal8 Local 5% 15% 15% 25%9 
DTA 5% ≥ 15% 
shareholding or 





15% Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
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otherwise 15% or 15% property 
21 Oman Local 10% 10% 10% 12% 
DTA Exempt Exempt Exempt Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
22 Pakistan Local 10% 10% 15% 35% 
DTA 10% 10% 12.5% Taxed in the 
alienator state 






Local 20% 10% 10% 15% 




Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property or 
shares in a 
property 
company 
24 Rwanda Local 15% 15% 15% 30% 
DTA Exempt Exempt Exempt Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
25 Senegal Local 10% 16% 20% 25% 
DTA Exempt Exempt Exempt Taxed in the 
alienator state 
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unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
26 Seychelles Local 15% 15% 15% 0% 
DTA Exempt Exempt Exempt Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
27 Singapore Local 0% 15% 10% 0% 
DTA Exempt Exempt Exempt Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
28 South Africa Local 15% N/A 15% 18.6% (for 
companies) 
DTA 5% ≥ 10% 
shareholding 
otherwise 15% 
Exempt Exempt Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
29 Sri Lanka Local 10% 10% 10% 0% 
DTA 10% ≥ 10% 
shareholding or 
15% 
10% 10% Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
30 State of Qatar Local 5%-7% 5%-7% 5%-7% 10% 
DTA Exempt Exempt 5% Taxed in the 
alienator state 
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unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
31 Swaziland Local 15% 10% 15% N/A 
DTA 7.5% 5% 7.5% Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
32 Sweden (New) Local 30% 0% 0% 22% 




Exempt Exempt Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
33 Thailand Local 10% 15% 15% 20% 




Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
34 Tunisia Local 0% 20% 15% 30% 
DTA Exempt 2.5% 2.5% Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
35 Uganda Local 15% 15% 15% 30% 
DTA 10% 10% 10% Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
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or immovable 
property 
36 United Arab 
Emirates 
Local 0% 0% 0% 0% 
DTA Exempt Exempt Exempt Taxed in the 
alienator state 





Local 0% 20% 20% 24% 





15% Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property 
38 Zimbabwe Local 10% if listed 
company 
otherwise 15% 
15% 15% 1% listed 
shares; 5% 
unlisted shares 
or 15% for 
immovable 
property 
DTA 10% > 25% 
shareholding 
otherwise 20% 
10% 15% Taxed in the 
alienator state 
unless it is a PE 
or immovable 
property or 
shares in a 
property 
company 
39 Zambia Local 15% 15% 20% 0% 
DTA 5% ≥ 25% 
shareholding 
exists or 15% 
10% 5% 0% 
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This treaty network is expected to increase as Mauritius 
has signed, but not yet ratified an additional 9 DTAs 
with Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, Guernsey, 
Russia, Rwanda (renegotiated) and South Africa 
(renegotiated). Mauritius has also negotiated but has 
not yet signed a DTA with Ghana (Mauritius Revenue 
Authority, 2014a).  
In the past the DTAs entered into by Mauritius 
predominantly provided for full taxing rights to be 
granted to Mauritius in respect of capital gains made on 
the sale of Mauritius property. As Mauritius does not 
impose tax on capital gains, this allowed for many 
instances where profits may have remained untaxed. As 
a result of this, together with the fact that some of the 
treaties in force may be out-dated, Mauritius has started 
to renegotiate a few of the DTAs (e.g. the DTAs with 
South Africa and Rwanda) (Mauritius Revenue 
Authority, 2014a).    
There are an additional 17 treaties that are under 
negotiation, these DTAs include jurisdictions such as, 
Algeria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Lesotho (renegotiated), Portugal, 
Republic of Iran, Malawi, Saudi Arabia, St. Kitts & 
Nevis, Vietnam, Yemen, Tanzania, Morocco and 
Montenegro. 
d. CGT Regime in Mauritius  
As an intermediary company transacts in the sale and 
purchase of investments, it is imperative that the sale 
transaction be free from CGT to avoid tax leakage on 
these transactions. This can be achieved in one of two 
manners, firstly through disregarding of the capital gain 
as a result of the provisions or secondly, through lack 
of a capital gains tax regime.  
Mauritius provides for this characteristic in that it does 
not impose a CGT Regime (Mauritius Revenue 
Authority, 1995). Any future sales of the investments 
would therefore be free from CGT.  Furthermore, the 
lack of a CGT regime will allow a MNE to undertake 
group reorganisations based on commercial rationale.  
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e. Tax on the increase in share capital  
Mauritius does not impose either capital duty or stamp 
duty on an increase of share capital. An injection of 
additional share capital in respect of additional funding 
will therefore not give rise to an additional tax 
(Deloitte, 2014a).  
f. Transfer pricing and thin capitalisation  
Other aspects in which the Mauritius legislation is 
favourable to foreign investors is the lack of a thin 
capitalisation regime (Mauritius Revenue Authority, 
1995). This allows for foreign investors to repatriate 
funds back to the shareholder's jurisdiction without a 
limitation in regard to the value of debt introduced 
versus the value of equity introduced. Debt is a 
preferred method of financing offshore investments as 
it results in a tax deduction for the company paying the 
interest and a before tax return of profits. This is 
converse to the employment of equity that facilitates 
the receipt of dividend income as a return on after tax 
profits.  
Although no specific transfer pricing rules exist, the 
MRA provides for anti-avoidance legislation that 
determines that transactions must be completed at a 
market related value. This provision would apply 
where goods or services are sold between group 
companies, effectively providing for a limitation on the 
pricing of inter-group transactions (Mauritius Revenue 
Authority, 1995).  
g. CFC Regime  
Any income earned by foreign subsidiary companies 
owned by the GBC 1 would not need to be imputed 
back to Mauritius, as Mauritius does not impose a CFC 
regime (Mauritius Revenue Authority, 1995).  
h. Optimisation of foreign tax credits  
Mauritius provides for an 80% deemed foreign tax 
credit against any income earned (Mauritius Revenue 
Authority, 1995). This allows for a reduction in the 
effective corporate tax rate from 15% to 3%.  
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i. The ability to undertake group reorganisations  
As mentioned above the absence of a CGT regime in 
Mauritius allows for a MNE to undertake group 
reorganisations free of any CGT consequences.  
j. Foreign exchange gains or losses  
The Mauritius Revenue Authority (1995) does not 
provide for specific legislation in respect of foreign 
exchange gains or losses, and as a result of this, any 
attributed fluctuations will be taxable at the effective 
corporate rate of 3%. 
k.  Exchange control regulations 
Mauritius does not impose exchange control 
regulations. 
4.1.2 GBL 2  
The Companies Act, 2001 and the Financial Services Act, 
2007, regulate GBL2 companies (GBC2). In order to 
qualify as a GBC2, the company must be beneficially 
owned by non-residents and operate exclusively outside 
Mauritius. GBC2 companies are considered to be non-
resident and are therefore not subject to corporate income 
tax. Likewise any payments made to a non-resident 
shareholder will not be subject to any withholding taxes.  
A large degree of privacy is applied around GBC2, as there 
is no requirement imposed to reveal the names of the 
beneficial owners (Anderson Ross Legal). Should 
additional privacy be required, a nominee company can be 
incorporated with nominee shareholders and directors. 
Mauritius does not apply a limitation on the number of 
shareholders and directors of a GBC2, and consequently the 
director and shareholder may be one and the same.  
Up until recently no requirement of presenting annual 
financial statement to the MRA was imposed, allowing for 
the annual financial statements of GBC2 to be kept private, 
and accounting records to be maintained only for the 
purposes of keeping track of the financial status of the 
company (Anderson Ross Legal). This requirement was 
amended and a GBC2 is now required by the Financial 
Services Act to submit their annual financial summary and 
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all information on the beneficial ownership to the Financial 
Services Commission (FSC).  
The GBC2 is subject to a more flexible regime than GBC1, 
but they do not benefit from double tax treaties. This is in 
contradiction to the fact that the exchange of information 
agreement may be applied to GBC2 companies (Mauritius 
Revenue Authority, 2014b).   
Another limitation that applies to a GBC2, in that in order 
to maintain its non-resident status, it may not carry on trade 
within Mauritius.   
4.2 Transparency of information  
Mauritius allows for privacy of information surrounding the 
shareholders of companies and beneficiaries of trusts. This 
has drawn attention and has resulted in Mauritius being 
placed on the OECD black list of tax havens along with 
many other similar jurisdictions. In order to avoid this 
categorisation, many jurisdictions have agreed to enter into 
exchange of information (EOI) agreements. To date 
Mauritius has entered into 5 EOI agreements that are 
presently in force. These agreements are with the following 




• Norway  
• States of Guernsey.  
 
An additional 2 EOI agreements have been signed, but are 
not yet ratified, with Faroe Island Greenland and Iceland. 
This list is soon to increase, as there are 3 more EOI 
agreements with the Isle of Man, Greece and India that are 
awaiting signature (Mauritius Revenue Authority, 2014a).  
4.3 Future of Mauritius 
The number of EOI agreements entered into and negotiated 
by Mauritius illustrates that Mauritius is under pressure by 
the OECD to amend its current regime as a tax haven. This 
is emphasized by the fact that Mauritius is renegotiating a 
few of the DTAs previously entered into, due to 
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unfavourable and out-dated provisions. This is evident from 
the South African / Mauritius DTA).  
Mauritius may therefore not be able to maintain its 
favourable regime indefinitely into the future.  
4.4 Mauritius characteristics versus the characteristics 
provided for by the new HQCR in South Africa 
The GBL 1 regime provides for most of the best practice 
characteristics required by an intermediary holding 
company. It can however be seen from the above discussion 
in Chapter 2, that some of the provisions that the new 
HQCR in South Africa also caters to these characteristics 
(subject to certain requirements being met). For the new 
South African HQCR, specific requirements must be met in 
order to obtain the exemptions relating to transfer pricing 
and thin capitalisation, furthermore, where these 
requirements have been met, the related deduction is still 
limited under section 20C of the South African Income Tax 
Act. The limitations imposed on the new South African 
HQCR contrasts the fact that Mauritius does not impose 
legislative requirements at all, such as:  
 
• No CGT regime is imposed in Mauritius;  
• No exchange control regulations are imposed in 
Mauritius; 
• No thin capitalisation regime is imposed in 
Mauritius; 
• No CFC regime exists in Mauritius. 
The above differences are further emphasised by the fact 
that:  
• Mauritius imposes an effective tax rate at 3% as 
opposed to the corporate tax rate of 28% in South 
Africa, and  
• An offshore investor can transact in a more stable 
currency, the Mauritian Rupee, rather than the South 
African Rand. 
It is therefore determined that if South Africa and Mauritius 
have both entered into a DTA with the respective 
jurisdiction required by a potential investor, it is likely that 
Mauritius will continue to be used as a headquarter 
company jurisdiction. This may not hold true in instances 
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where only South Africa has entered into a DTA with the 
respective jurisdiction as the potential investors may then 
consider entering into the new South African HQCR due to 
the lack of alternatives.  
4.5 Conclusion  
The GBL 1 regime in Mauritius is a long established regime 
that is used by offshore investors to invest into Africa. The 
Mauritius regime provides for many of the characteristics 
that are required to establish an effective headquarter 
company regime:  
 
• Although companies are considered to be Mauritian 
tax residents under this regime, the Mauritian 
corporate tax rate of 15% is reduced by an 80% tax 
credit. As a result of this, an effective tax rate of 3% 
will apply to all companies registered as a GBC 1.   
• Dividend income received by the GBC1 from a 
Mauritius tax resident company is exempt. Interest 
income received by a GBC1 company is also 
exempt if paid out of foreign sourced income. All 
other income will be taxed at the effective corporate 
tax rate of 3%. 
• Mauritius currently has a total of 39 treaties with 
other jurisdictions. In addition to these DTAs 
Mauritius will also be entering into new DTAs with 
an additional 7 jurisdictions, of which 6 have been 
signed but are not yet ratified and one is awaiting 
signature. 
• Dividend payments made to non-resident 
shareholders of Mauritius will not be subject to a 
withholding tax in Mauritius if the intermediary 
company is in possession of a GBL1. 
• Mauritius does however levy a withholding tax on 
interest, royalties and management fees paid to non-
resident. The withholding tax is levied at the 
respective rates of 15%, 15% and 10%. These rates 
may be reduced through application of any one of 
the 39 DTAs entered into and shortly the other 
seven DTAs to be entered into.  
• Mauritius does not impose a CGT regime and 
consequently any sale of equity shares in 
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investments held will therefore not be subject to 
CGT.  
• Mauritius does not impose a thin capitalisation 
regime on transactions with non-resident companies, 
thereby allowing for the repatriation of funds to a 
non-resident shareholder in the form of interest. 
Although no specific transfer pricing regime exists, 
transactions are required to be completed at an arm's 
length price.  
• Mauritius does not impose CFC legislation in 
respect of subsidiaries where more than a 50% 
shareholding is held.  Any income earned by the 
subsidiary companies will therefore not be imputed 
back to the Mauritius company.  
• The lack of CGT would allow for a company to 
undertake group reorganisations free from any CGT 
implications, based only on commercial rationale.  
• No specific foreign exchange regulations are 
provided for in the Mauritian tax act, resulting in a 
taxable gain or loss on any foreign exchange 
movement. This gain or loss will only be subject to 
tax at the maximum effective tax rate of 3%.  
• Mauritius does not impose an exchange control 
regime, thereby allowing the intermediary company 
to freely invest offshore.  
In addition to the GBL 1 regime, Mauritius also offers non-
residents, who wish to retain their non-resident status and 
not undertake any business in Mauritius an opportunity to 
register for a GBL 1I.  These companies will not be subject 
to the benefits provided under the DTAs. 
The second sub-problem assesses whether or not the new 
South African HQCR is able to compete with other well 
established headquarter company regimes. In order to 
assess this it must be determined if there are any 
characteristics that are offered by the new South African 
HQCR that is not offered by other headquarter company 
jurisdictions (i.e. such as Mauritius). The above discussion 
highlights that there is only one characteristic that is offered 
by the new South African HQCR which is not offered by 
Mauritius. This characteristic is identified as the blanket 
exemption in respect of withholding taxes on payments 
made to non-residents.  
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Mauritius does however provide for many characteristics 
that are not provided for in the new South African HQCR 
such as the much lower corporate tax rate (i.e. at 3%) 
versus the corporate tax rate of 28% imposed by South 
Africa. It can therefore be seen that the new South African 
HQCR does not offer potential investors with any unique 
benefits, instead there are jurisdictions that offer more 
beneficial characteristics (such as Mauritius).  
The only instance that a potential investor may consider the 
alternative option of entering into the new South African 
HQCR is where a DTA is available between South Africa 
and a respective jurisdiction that has not been entered into 
between Mauritius and that jurisdiction. This will only hold 
true if the negotiated rates in the DTA are more beneficial 
than the local rates applied in that jurisdiction.  
It is also noted that the generous tax system is giving rise to 
Mauritius being regularly viewed as a tax haven. This is 
initiating a large amount of pressure on Mauritius to amend 
the beneficial tax characteristics that identify it as a tax 
haven. This can be seen from both the increasing number of 
Exchange of Information agreements entered into by 
Mauritius and the renegotiated DTAs.  As a result it has 
become questionable as to whether or not Mauritius will be 
able to indefinitely provide the beneficial characteristics 
that it currently offers to potential investors under the 
GBL1. 
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5. Chapter 5: Tax havens versus low tax jurisdictions 
5.1 Introduction  
The term tax haven does not have a precise meaning, but 
has been identified by the OECD as a country that is able to 
finance its public services with no or nominal income taxes 
and which actively makes itself available to non-residents 
for the avoidance of tax which would otherwise be paid at a 
relatively high rate (Ogley, 1993). 
Due to the implementation of harmful tax practices, tax 
havens have acquired a negative image. Jurisdictions can 
establish a tax haven in one of three ways as a (Olivier & 
Honiball, 2011): 
• a jurisdiction that does not impose any taxes; 
• low tax jurisdictions; or 
• a jurisdiction that grants tax concessions or 
privileges. 
As a result of the limitation of corporate taxes imposed, tax 
havens are considered to hamper the development of other 
countries by what is identified as the 7 tax haven sins 
(Eriksson, 2009): 
• Tax havens encroach heavily on the on the sovereignty of 
other countries; 
• Tax havens harm the efficiency of financial markets;  
• Tax havens undermining the national tax systems and 
thereby increase the costs of taxation; 
• Tax havens reducing the efficiency of resource allocation; 
• Tax havens make it more profitable and less risky to engage 
in economic and other crimes;  
• Tax havens hurt private income; 
• Tax havens hurt institutional quality (bureaucracy at large) 
and thereby economic growth (and democratic development 
in the long run). 
This chapter considers the most prominent characteristics 
that are identified with a tax haven as (Tax Justice Network, 
2007) (Gravelle, 2013):  
• No or nominal income taxes that result in a place for 
non-residents to escape their taxes.  
• A lack of exchange of information through the 
application of laws that promote secrecy and lack of 
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transparency. This is normally in the form of banking 
secrecy, and secrecy of legal entities.  
• A lack of application in respect of legislative, legal or 
administrative provisions.  
• The absence of qualifying activity. This would suggest 
that the jurisdiction has established tax laws with the 
purpose of attracting investments. 
• A ring fenced tax system. (i.e. a regime that provides 
preferential treatment and that is isolated from the 
domestic economy); and 
• Legislation that favours foreign investors. 
5.2 Definition of a tax haven   
MNE’s require an ideal base from which to expand into 
different parts of the world, and they therefore look to 
establish an offshore holding company in a jurisdiction that 
is an OFC jurisdiction or a tax haven.  
Although, an OFC and a tax haven are closely linked and 
share many of the same features, a distinction does exist 
between what is referred to as a tax haven jurisdiction, and 
what is referred to as an OFC jurisdiction (Tax Justice 
Network, 2007).    
5.2.1 Tax haven and harmful tax regimes 
The dominant features of a tax haven, is that no tax or tax at 
a low rate is imposed, and that the country is generally able 
to meet its fiscal needs through the levying of indirect taxes 
(Ogley, 1993). As a result of the nominal taxes imposed, a 
large volume of activity flows through these jurisdictions. 
Minimisation of taxes is an important feature in a tax 
haven, and this minimisation is effected through the 
implementation of tax laws. Other characteristics that 
identify tax havens are elaborated on below.  
These jurisdictions often struggle to enter into DTAs, as 
they have no taxes to reduce and are not able to offer a 
compromise with another jurisdiction. As a result, they are 
not generally recognised as ideal holding company 
jurisdictions. 
Various lists have been released over time identifying the 
countries’ that are regarded as tax havens.  The most well-
known report that was released in 1998 by the OCED, not 
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only identified these jurisdictions but also the 
characteristics that can be found in these jurisdictions (Tax 
Justice Network, 2007).  
According to the Tax Justice Network (2007), the OECD 
initially identified 47 tax haven jurisdictions in this report, 
which were 'blacklisted'. Amongst the jurisdictions 
identified as tax havens, the list also mentioned a number of 
significant OFCs such as Luxembourg, Switzerland, UK, 
Ireland, Singapore and Dubai, which illustrates that OFCs 
at large share many of the same characteristics as tax 
havens.  
Subsequently the 47 tax haven jurisdictions were reduced to 
41, when 6 of the jurisdictions agreed to co-operate. 
As a result of being blacklisted, many of the identified 
countries committed to improving transparency and 
establishing effective exchange of information, which 
resulted in a decrease of the blacklist from 41 to 5 
countries. In addition to this, three of the jurisdictions that 
were previously identified, were no longer considered to be 
tax havens. The remaining 5 countries that were identified, 
as non-committed countries, were Andorra, Lichtenstein, 
Monaco, Liberia and the Marshall islands.  
The OECD also completed work in identifying preferential 
tax regimes in jurisdictions that are not considered to be tax 
havens. The regimes were identified based on the same 
characteristics provided by a tax haven (Tax Justice 
Network, 2007): 
• Low or nominal tax rates; 
• Ring fencing of the regime; 
• Lack of transparency; 
• Lack of effective exchange of information. 
In general these regimes were found to encourage tax 
driven operations or arrangements and in this sense 
correspond to tax havens.  
A list of 47 potential harmful tax regimes was identified in 
20 OECD countries. A subsequent list was published in 
2006 (Tax Justice Network, 2007) that confirmed that most 
of the regimes had either been abolished or were not found 
to be harmful (after a detailed investigation into the 
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regimes). The Luxembourg holding company regime was 
found to be an exception and remained identified as a 
harmful tax regime. 
Simultaneously, the European Union (EU) performed an 
investigation into tax havens, and identified a number of 
harmful tax regimes based on the EU Code of Conduct on 
Business Taxation This list that was released in the 
Primarolo Report, identified many of the same states as the 
OECD report. Included in this Report, that has subsequently 
been cleared after its holding company regime was 
amended, was Austria.  
The EU still continues its work in identifying tax havens, 
but no amendments have been released since the Primarolo 
Report (Tax Justice Network, 2007).  
The list of identified EU tax havens below is compared to 
the list of identified OFC’s (Tax Justice Network, 2007).  
5.2.2 Definition of an Offshore Finance Centre (OFC) 
The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) is another recognised 
body that has also made an effort to identify what is 
referred to as an OFC. The criteria used to identify these 
jurisdiction was similar to the criteria used by the OECD, 
and was based on the regulatory environment.  These 
criteria included characteristics such as (Tax Justice 
Network, 2007);  
• limited or no taxes imposed on investment income;  
• lack of withholding taxes; 
• no or limited regulation around incorporation;  
• limited regulation around supervisory regimes;  
• flexible use of trusts or other special corporate 
vehicles; 
• no physical presence required; 
• high level of client confidentiality; 
• incentives only apply to non-residents. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has made use of 
this list identifying OFC's in order to monitor financial 
institutions compliance.  In determining this list, the IMF 
has performed a detailed study into what basis should be 
used in identifying an OFC (Tax Justice Network, 2007). 
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Tax Justice Network (2007) detailed the definition of an 
OFC provided by Ahmed Zerome (2007) to the IMF as:  
An OFC is a country or jurisdiction that provides financial 
services to non-residents on a scale that is incommensurate with 
the size and the financing of its domestic economy. 
This definition was concluded on the following three 
characteristics: 
• the primary orientation of business towards non-
residents; 
• the favourable regulatory environment (low 
supervisory requirements and minimum disclosure);  
• low or zero tax schemes.  
The report released by the Tax Justice Network (2007), 
noted that there was a discrepancy between the FSF’s view 
that the regulatory requirements are significant in 
determining whether or not a jurisdiction qualifies as an 
OFC, and the work performed by the IMF. Instead Ahmed 
Zerome (2007) considered that the economic environment 
of the respective jurisdiction is a significant factor.  
Defining an OFC based on the economic environment gives 
rise to two potential problems:  
The first problem being identified as the lack of available 
data on the net financial services exports to a non-resident 
company or individual. 
The second problem is determining what ratio of financial 
services to non-residents would be considered as 
incommensurate to the domestic economy. The Tax Justice 
Network (2007) resolved that the domestic GDP should be 
calculated in proportion to the net financial services exports 
to determine what is considered as incommensurate. This 
potential solution poses an additional potential problem as it 
does not address instances where financial services are 
limited in comparison to corporate and trust formation 
services.  
A large number of similar characteristics between OFC’s 
and tax havens do exist, even though many OFC’s are not 
considered to be tax havens and vice versa (Tax Justice 
Network, 2007). The dominant distinction is that the 
primary focus of an OFC is to provide a base from which 
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financial services can be performed. This base may 
generally be situated in normal to high tax jurisdiction 
(Olivier & Honiball, 2011), with specific incentives offered.  
This distinction allows OFC’s to enter into DTAs (an 
opportunity that is generally not afforded to tax havens as 
there cannot be a compromise of taxes by both parties), 
thereby allowing the foreign shareholder to benefit from the 
reduced treaty rates.  
Olivier and Honiball (2011) defined a OFC as a low or no 
tax haven jurisdiction sometimes situated within a high tax 
country. In instances where the OFC is situated within a 
high tax country, it may be easier for the OFC's jurisdiction 
to enter into DTAs as a compromise relating to taxes, 
between the two jurisdictions can occur. The tax beneficial 
characteristics (that are similar to tax havens) are provided 
by OFC’s in the form of special regimes. This affords a 
financial services company with an ideal environment in 
which to establish an intermediary company, as the MNE 
will benefit from a reduced tax rate through the application 
of the incentives provided for in the DTAs, as well as the 
large network of DTAs. 
The IMF published a working paper identifying three of the 
characteristics found in an OFC as (Tax Justice Network, 
2007):  
• the primary orientation of business is aimed towards 
non-residents;  
• a favourable regulatory environment (i.e. low 
supervisory requirements and minimal information 
disclosure); and 
• the application of low or zero taxation schemes. 
5.2.3 Identified tax haven and OFC jurisdictions  
The Tax Justice Network (TJN) released a comprehensive 
list in 2007 that identified both tax havens and OFC’s. This 
list included all the jurisdictions identified by the OECD as 
pure tax havens, some of which are identified as the 
standard offshore island states which facilitate tax 
avoidance through low tax rates and secrecy (Tax Justice 
Network, 2007). 
This list was further extended to cover jurisdictions that 
facilitate harmful tax regimes but are not considered to be 
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pure tax havens, as well as countries that have a reputation 
of being a tax haven.  
We compare the lists below (Tax Justice Network, 2007; 
Gravelle, 2013):  
Country OECD  FSF- IMF  TJN 
Andorra Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Anguilla  Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 







Bahamas Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Bahrain  Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Barbados Removed from 
OECD 2006 
List 
OFC Tax Haven 
Belgium  Harmful 
Regime 
  
Belize Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Bermuda Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 




Cayman Islands Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Cook Islands Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Costa Rica Removed from 
OECD 2006 
OFC Tax Haven 
	   85	  
List 
Cyprus Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Dominica Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Dubai  Removed from 
OECD 2006 
List 









 Tax Haven 




Grenada Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Guernsey, Sark and 
Alderly 
Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Hong Kong  Removed from 
OECD 2006 
List 
OFC Tax Haven 
Hungry Harmful 
Regime 
 Tax Haven 
Iceland Harmful 
Regime 
 Tax Haven 
Ireland Harmful 
Regime 
OFC Tax Haven 
Isle of Man Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Israel Removed from 
OECD 2006 
List 
 Tax Haven 
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Italy  Harmful 
Regime 
 Tax Haven 








Lebanon Removed from 
OECD 2006 
List 
OFC Tax Haven 
Liberia Tax Haven  Tax Haven 
Lichtenstein Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Luxembourg  Harmful 
Regime 
OFC Tax Haven 
Macao Removed from 
OECD 2006 
List 
OFC Tax Haven 
Malaysia Removed from 
OECD 2006 
List 
OFC Tax Haven 
Maldives Removed from 
OECD 2006 
List 
 Tax Haven 
Malta  Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Marshall Islands Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Mauritius Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Monaco Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Montserrat Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Nauru Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Netherlands Harmful   




Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 






 Tax Haven 




Panama Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Portugal Harmful 
Regime 
 Tax Haven 
Russia Removed from 
OECD 2006 
List 
 Tax Haven 
Saint Kitts and 
Naves 
Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Saint Lucia Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Saint Vincent and 
Grenadines 
Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Samoa Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
San Marino Tax Haven   
Sao Tome e Principe Removed from 
OECD 2006 
List 
 Tax Haven 
Seychelles  Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
Singapore Removed from 
OECD 2006 
List 
OFC Tax Haven 
Somalia Removed from 
OECD 2006 
 Tax Haven 
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List 
South Africa Removed from 
OECD 2006 
List 
 Tax Haven 
Spain Harmful 
Regime 






OFC Tax Haven 
Taiwan Removed from 
OECD 2006 
List 
 Tax Haven 
Tonga Removed from 
OECD 2006 
List 
 Tax Haven 








 Tax Haven 
Turks and Caicos 
Isles 
Tax Haven OFC Tax Haven 
United Kingdom  Removed from 
OECD 2006 
List 
 Tax Haven 




US Virgin Isles Tax Haven  Tax Haven 
USA Harmful 
Regime 
 Tax Haven 
Vanuatu Removed from 
OECD 2006 
 Tax Haven 
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List 
 
The above lists have been identified through the common 
characteristics found in tax havens and OFC’s. The 
similarities identified between these two types of 
jurisdictions is determined as the method of profit stripping 
applied in order to repatriate funds to the parent company 
(namely the foreign investor). The most prominent methods 
of profit shifting are identified below (Gravelle, 2013). 
5.3 Methods of profit shifting used by tax havens.  
5.3.1 Allocation of Debt and Earnings Stripping 
One method identified of profit shifting (Gravelle, 2013) is 
to shift the borrowing exposure from a low tax jurisdiction 
to a high tax jurisdiction. This would result in the overall 
group debt remaining the same but a lower group tax 
exposure. This is known as debt stripping.  
 
Alternatively, earning stripping (Gravelle, 2013) can also 
occur where financing is obtained from a unrelated foreign 
borrower that lends the required financing to the group 
company, as opposed to a related borrower that would have 
been subject to tax on the interest income earned.  
5.3.2 Cross crediting and sourcing rules for foreign tax 
credits  
Taxation may also be limited by the use of foreign tax 
credits to offset local taxes payable. The timing of cross 
crediting can be used in such a way to maximise the 
benefits of a foreign high tax jurisdiction, where income is 
simultaneously repatriated from a low tax jurisdiction.  
5.3.3 Transfer Pricing 
MNEs utilise the sale of goods and services between 
affiliates to shift profits. Profit shifting in this manner is 
usually achieved by an increase in the cost of goods sold to 
a parent company (where profits are repatriated out of a 
jurisdiction) and decreasing the pricing of goods where 
profits want to be retained in a jurisdiction (Gravelle, 
2013). Where transfer-pricing legislation is applied, the 
price of the goods would be dictated by the actual market 
value that could be obtained. The absence of this regime, 
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would allow for a company to determine the most 
beneficial price of the goods sold, where the mark up would 
prove to be the most effective (i.e. in a low tax jurisdiction).  
5.3.4 Contract manufacturing in a low tax jurisdiction  
A subsidiary is established in a low tax jurisdiction to 
manufacture products (Gravelle, 2013). These products are 
then sold from this jurisdiction to the customers situated in 
a high tax jurisdiction, thereby avoiding the effect of the 
increased tax rate. 
5.3.5 Hybrid Instruments and Entities 
Hybrid entities that are recognised by one jurisdiction and 
not by another may result in different tax treatment between 
two jurisdictions and give rise to tax benefits (example: 
Excessive interest payments from a hybrid entity may not 
be taxable as the hybrid entity is not considered to be a 
separate entity).  
Similarly hybrid instruments may be viewed as debt 
instruments in one jurisdiction and as an equity instruments 
in another, giving rise to a tax deduction but no 
corresponding inclusion in taxable income. 
5.4 Does the new South African HQCR participate in 
the harmful tax practices identified above 
In view of the fact that Mauritius and the new South 
African HQCR share many of the same characteristics, 
consideration must be given as to whether or not the new 
South African HQCR will be recognised as partaking in 
potentially harmful tax regime.  
 
In establishing the regime, the Department of National 
Treasury identified one of the key intentions of the new SA 
HQCR to not be considered as partaking in harmful tax 
practices.  
 
A tax haven is identified as a jurisdiction that provides 
certain characteristics that are aimed at foreign investors. 
The new South African HQCR provides beneficial 
characteristics that are aimed at foreign investors in a 
similar manner, in some respects to Mauritius, such as the: 
• limitation of withholding tax applied to payments 
made to non-residents 
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• exemption from corporate tax on dividend income 
earned;  
• exemption from CGT on the sale of investments and 
subsidiaries to foreign residents;  
• exemption from exchange control regulations.  
As beneficial as these characteristics may be, one would 
need to consider whether or not the harmful tax practices 
associated with a tax haven are apparent in the new SA 
HQCR.  
The harmful tax practices, as identified above are:  
5.4.1 Allocation of debt and earnings shifting  
Where a foreign investor lends money to a new SA HQCR, 
the transaction would be free from thin capitalisation 
legislation, due to the headquarter company exemption 
provided for under section 31. This would allow for the 
offshore investor to interject a foreign company (situated in 
a low tax jurisdiction) in between the new South African 
HQC and the foreign parent company and use debt funding 
via this entity.  
The lack of thin capitalisation rules would allow for the 
new South African HQC to transfer interest income to the 
low tax jurisdiction from South Africa without a limitation. 
This will however not be beneficial to the new SA HQC as 
a limited tax deduction will apply to the interest paid, in 
terms of section 20C of the Act.    
5.4.2 Cross crediting and sourcing rules for foreign tax 
credits  
Section 6quat and 6quin of the Act allows for foreign tax 
credits to be claimed in respect of foreign income earned. 
The calculation of the allowable foreign tax credit is limited 
to the South African tax paid on the foreign income 
included in taxable income. This limitation will make it 
difficult to offset excessive foreign tax credits against local 
taxes or other high tax jurisdictions.  The new South 
African HQCR will not fall foul of this profit shifting 
mechanism.  
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5.4.3 Transfer pricing and thin capitalisation  
Although the new South African HQCR does not impose a 
transfer pricing or thin capitalisation regime, this is only in 
respect of foreign financing and IP. Should the new HQC 
wish to purchase goods or services from a parent company 
at a value that does not reflect the fair market value, this 
regime would still be applicable.   
In order to provide shareholders with the option of 
repatriating funds to the jurisdiction that the shareholders 
consider most effective, tax havens do not generally impose 
a transfer pricing or thin capitalisation regime in any 
measure.  
The relaxation of this regime still imposes certain 
limitations and will not likely be considered as a harmful 
tax practice. 
5.4.4 Contract manufacturing in a low tax jurisdiction  
The new HQCR imposes a normal corporate tax rate of 
28% on income earned. When comparing this tax rate to 
other low tax jurisdictions, (such as the effective corporate 
tax rate of 3% imposed by Mauritius) it can be seen that 
South Africa will not be considered to be a low tax 
jurisdiction and will therefore not fall foul of this 
mechanism of profit shifting.  
5.4.5 Hybrid Instruments 
Section 8E and section 8F of the Act provides for specific 
anti-avoidance provisions that relates to instruments 
identified as hybrid debt instruments. These provisions 
apply to equity instruments that are considered to reflect the 
nature of debt instruments. Any income received in respect 
of such instruments is consequently deemed to be taxable 
income in the hands of the recipient. This anti-avoidance 
provision will therefore prohibit the avoidance of tax using 
hybrid debt instruments.  
5.5 Conclusion  
The OECD is not concerned about low or no tax 
jurisdictions in itself. Instead it is the practices that these 
jurisdictions often become associated with that result in the 
unjust non-taxation of MNE’s that the OECD is concerned 
about. These practices are normally achieved through the 
	   93	  
application of the bilateral agreements and gaps in the 
interaction of relevant tax jurisdictions, and result in what is 
commonly referred to as Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS).  
Tax havens achieve BEPS through reducing the effective 
tax rate applicable in a jurisdiction to nil or a minimal rate. 
In addition to this, they offer an environment where no 
transfer pricing legislation is effective and a specific regime 
that is aimed at foreign investors is applied.  
A large number of lists identifying tax havens have been 
published by various bodies such as the OECD, EU and 
Tax Justice Network in order to assist with the 
identification of tax haven jurisdictions. These lists consider 
all the jurisdictions that have implemented a regime 
displaying profit-shifting characteristics. It became apparent 
that these characteristics are also found in an OFC even 
though it may not be formally classified as a tax haven. 
This is due to the fact that the OFC is predominantly aimed 
at providing financial services to a non-resident, and not at 
promoting foreign investment through tax incentives.  
In reviewing the prominent methods of profit shifting 
undertaken by a tax haven or an OFC, it is found that the 
new HQC regime does not participate in harmful tax 
practice as there are a large number of anti-avoidance 
provisions that would still apply in respect of the new 
HQCR: 
• The limitation on the interest deductibility in respect 
of section 20C;  
• The requirements as determined by section 6quat 
and section 6quin before a foreign tax credit can be 
utilised;  
• The high tax rate of 28%; 
• The anti-avoidance provisions relating to hybrid 
debt instruments under Section 8E and section 8F 
address the third sub-problem as to whether or not 
the profit shifting mechanisms frequented by 
harmful tax regimes are implemented in the new 
HQCR. 
As determined above, the new HQCR is subject to a vast 
range of anti-avoidance provisions that are intended to 
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prohibit profit shifting through the abuse of a headquarter 
company. The initiative applied in this regard may prove to 
be beneficial to the new HQC as an increasing number of 
headquarter companies may fall foul of these initiatives.  
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6. Chapter 6: OECD and Tax havens 
According to the OECD (2013), the increased sophistication of tax 
planners in identifying and exploiting the legal arbitrage and 
boundaries of acceptable tax planning causes a large loss to the 
fiscus. This is a common problem for many different jurisdictions 
that results in the receipt of fewer resources to allocate to 
infrastructure and services and has become known as Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting (BEPS). BEPS is the reason that the OECD and 
many other countries have taken to combating the use of tax haven 
jurisdictions. The OECD has identified the cause of BEPS as 
(OECD, 2013):  
 
In an increasingly interconnected world, national tax laws have not kept 
pace with global corporations, fluid capital, and the digital economy, 
leaving gaps that can be exploited by companies who avoid taxation in 
their home countries by pushing activities abroad to low or no tax 
jurisdictions. 
 
Where MNEs have decided to minimise their tax burden through a 
tax haven jurisdiction, this has resulted in three dominant 
problems, namely (OECD, 2013):  
 
• Governments are being harmed. Governments incur a higher 
cost of compliance and a smaller revenue stream. This results 
in an under funding in public investments that could otherwise 
have promoted growth in developing countries.  
• Individual taxpayers are harmed. If MNEs pay less tax, the 
individual taxpayer is required to carry a larger share of the tax 
burden.  
• Businesses are harmed. Smaller businesses that do not have 
the ability to shift profits to low tax jurisdictions would have a 
competitive disadvantage. Fair competition is harmed by the 
misrepresentation of the MNE’s tax rate.   
 
The recent G20 summit held in July 2013 in Moscow launched an 
action plan of 15 points to combat BEPS (OECD, 2013). The G20 
Head of States at the meeting in Saint Petersburg further endorsed 
this plan. The points identified in the action plan addressed the 
three dominant causes of BEPS that were identified by the OECD 
as:  
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6.1 Issue 1: The spread of digital economy 
The digital economy is largely based on the intangible 
assets of data usage. As a result of this, it has become 
difficult to determine in which jurisdiction the source and 
value creation of the asset occurs in (OECD, 2013).  The 
OECD has determined that these risks should be addressed 
and options should be established to ensure that both direct 
and indirect tax collection occurs with respect to digital 
economies.  
The OECD (2013), identified the risks that to be addressed 
as: 
• the company's ability to have a digital presence in a jurisdiction 
without the liability of tax due to the lack of a nexus;  
• the characterisation of income derived from new business models;  
• the application of source rules;  
• attribution of the value created from the generation of marketable 
location relevant data through the use of digital products and 
services.  
6.2 Issue 2: Establishing coherence of corporate income 
tax 
Each country enforces sovereignty over the tax legislation 
implemented at the country level. As a result, consideration 
as to how the legislation would interact between countries 
is often disregarded. Where the domestic tax legislation of 
the two countries do not correspond, this may result in a 
loophole that gives rise to double non-taxation (OECD, 
2013). The OECD international standards have not yet 
resolved this issue, and consequently a need exists to align 
the current international standard (i.e. the DTA addressing 
the issue of double tax) with standards addressing the issue 
of non-taxation. The OECD have identified four action 
points to address the risk of non-coherence: 
6.2.1 Neutralise the effect of hybrid mismatch arrangements  
Hybrid mismatch arrangements and arbitrage are common 
BEPS instruments used to achieve a double deduction with 
no corresponding tax inclusion (OECD, 2013). This is 
achieved through the misuse of tax credits or participation 
exemption regimes and commonly occurs in countries that 
allow a taxpayer to choose the tax treatment of domestic 
and foreign entities. Although no taxes have been lost in the 
actual countries (as the legislation has been complied with), 
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the total taxes paid have been reduced overall. This results 
in a competitive disadvantage to other companies, as well 
as economic inefficiencies.  
 
The OECD proposes that model treaty provisions and 
recommendations regarding the domestic legislation be 
amended in order to avoid the unjust benefits provided by 
hybrid instruments and entities. These provisions should be 
directed at reducing double non-taxation, double deduction 
or long-term deferral and can be achieved through changes 
to the OECD Model Tax Convention and /or domestic law 
provisions. The OECD has suggested that provisions be 
introduced that:  
• prevents an deduction in one jurisdiction where the 
corresponding income in a different jurisdiction is 
exempt; and 
• denies a deduction for exempt income earned by the 
recipient; and  
• prohibits a double deduction; and  
• provides guidance on the application of the 
tiebreaker rules in the DTA if more than one country 
attempts to simultaneously apply the provisions to a 
structure.  
 
Upon determining these provisions, it is imperative that the 
domestic legislation is aligned to the amendments made to 
the OECD Model Tax Convention.  
6.2.2  Strengthen Controlled Foreign Company rules 
It has become increasingly common to achieve profit 
shifting by creating a non-resident subsidiary in another low 
tax jurisdiction (OECD, 2013). This would allow for the 
routing of income through this non-resident group 
company.  
 
In order to oppose this, many jurisdictions impose CFC 
legislation. These rules are however country specific and 
may not be targeted at addressing the risk of BEPS.  
 
CFC regimes in principle lead to the proportional inclusions 
of taxable income in the resident country of the ultimate 
parent. As a result of this incentive, profit shifting to a low 
tax jurisdiction is minimised. The design of CFC legislation 
must be considered internationally.  
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6.2.3 Limit base erosion via interest deductions and other 
financial payments 
It has become a common practice for MNEs to shift profits 
by means of an interest payment made to the parent 
company on hybrid debt (OECD, 2013). This would allow 
for a tax deduction in the high tax state and a favourable or 
non-taxed interest in the recipient state. Transfer pricing 
legislation should be implemented to avoid an excessive 
interest deduction.  
6.2.4 	  Counter harmful tax practices more effectively, taking 
into account transparency and substance	  
The competitive reduction of taxes may result in what is 
known as a “race to the bottom” (OECD, 2013). A common 
set of transparency rules should be introduced to avoid this 
from occurring. These rules should improve transparency 
around harmful tax practices by improving exchange of 
information on preferential regimes. Preferential regimes 
are to be evaluated in light of BEPS and the existing 
framework revised to restore the benefits of international 
standards. 
6.3 Issue 3:  Restoring the benefits of international 
standards 
Although specific country legislation and DTAs may be 
effective in the respective if individually considered, 
interaction with another jurisdiction may result in a double 
non-taxation (OECD, 2013).  
A realignment of taxation and relevant substance is needed 
to restore the intended effects and benefits of OECD 
international standards, which may not have been amended 
according to recent changes.  
 
As an example, DTAs do not always address profit shifting 
where a third party shell company has been used to 
facilitate the transfer of funds. These third party shell 
companies often have no or little substance.  
 
The OECD identified 5 methods of addressing the above 
problems: 
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6.3.1  Prevention of DTA abuse 
The introduction of DTAs may result in the unintended 
consequences of treaty shopping and double non-taxation 
practices, which can be avoided through anti-avoidance 
provisions in DTA clauses (OECD, 2013).  
Further to this, the original intention of a DTA should be 
emphasised which is the avoidance of double taxation as 
opposed to non-taxation.  
6.3.2 Artificial avoidance of a permanent establishment (PE) 
Fragmentation of income streams and specific PE planning 
allows for a significantly different tax effect than that that 
may have occurred if a PE had existed (OECD, 2013), as a 
result a clearer definition of a PE must be introduced.  
6.3.3 Re-examine Transfer pricing documentation   
The BEPS report (OECD, 2013) identified disconnect 
between the location where value creating activities and 
investment occur and the location where profits are taxed.  
 
Transfer pricing rules should be imposed to ensure that the 
activities and taxation occurs in the same jurisdiction to 
minimise profit shifting through the use of intangibles and 
capital. This cannot be achieved through applying a general 
profit apportionment formula to all transactions as MNE’s 
may undertake investment decisions that are not 
commercially viable in order to achieve a more tax neutral 
approach (OECD, 2013).  
 
The OECD proposes to develop and enforce regulations 
that require all MNE’s to provide relevant governments 
with an allocation of income, economic activities and taxes 
paid to all countries.  
 
The principle of transfer pricing is dependent on 
transparency of information. Where this does not exist the 
arms-length principle is undermined and BEPS can occur 
(OECD, 2013).  
 
Furthermore, emphasis on transfer pricing provisions must 
be addressed in three areas, namely (OECD, 2013): 
a. Intangibles 
Rules should be developed to prohibit the shifting of 
intangibles between group companies. In order to do 
this, a clear definition of intangibles must be 
established, the profits earned from intangibles must 
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be appropriately allocated based on the value 
creation, transfer pricing rules must be established for 
the transfer of intangibles and finally guidance must 
be developed on cost contribution arrangements 
between MNE companies.  
b. Risks and capital 
Rules should be developed to prohibit allocation of 
excessive capital to group members. Transfer pricing 
rules will need to be developed to ensure that 
inappropriate returns for excessive capital and risk 
assumption are not assumed. This will require the 
realignment of value creation and returns. 
c. Other high-risk transactions 
Legislation should be introduced that would prevent 
high-risk transactions that do not normally occur 
between third parties, from occurring between group 
companies. This can be achieved by:  
 
• clarify the situation in which transfer pricing 
rules would apply; and  
• providing protection against base erosion in the 
form of head office expenses and management 
fees. 
 
6.4 Issue 4: Ensuring transparency of information 
while promoting increased certainty and 
predictability 
It is difficult to impose transparency of a taxpayer’s 
information, as the right balance between privacy and the 
need for a jurisdiction to enforce their laws must be 
obtained. The OECD has determined that transparency can 
be obtained by implementing the following procedures 
(OECD, 2013): 
 
6.4.1 Disclose any aggressive tax planning arrangements  
Mandatory disclosure must be made in respect of tax 
planning arrangements that may be regarded as aggressive 
arrangements, with significant focus on international tax 
schemes.   
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6.4.2 Transparency around Transfer Pricing documentation  
The OECD has recognised the need to develop transfer-
pricing legislation that promotes transparency. A general 
design of transfer pricing legislation will be used to allow 
for identified country specific risks. 
Implementation of this general design may prove onerous 
and consideration should therefore be given to the 
administrative burden and costs involved for companies in 
doing so.  
The general design would require MNEs to provide 
information on income, economic activity and taxes paid to 
the respective governments.  This would enable a more 
targeted approach to tax planning strategies and transfer 
pricing.  
6.4.3 Establish a means of data collection  
In promoting the transparency of information, a means of 
collecting data must be established. This tool should enable 
the monitoring of the specific points identified in the action 
plan at the G20 conference and provide for: 
• improved data collection; 
• identifying new types of data; and 
• creating new methodologies.   
6.4.4 Make dispute resolution procedures more effective 
The OECD has identified that where greater transparency is 
required from taxpayers, a need will arise for an increased 
certainty around dispute resolution procedures.  
Solutions must therefore be developed to address instances 
where dispute resolution cannot be achieved due to the lack 
of arbitration provisions in the treaties. Work must be 
performed to streamline the dispute resolution process and 
enforce arbitration provisions in the DTAs.  
This may require amendments to domestic legislation and 
the Commentary to the OECD Model Tax Convention and 
the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, and OECD Model Tax 
Convention.  In addition to this, it would also require 
amendments to the DTAs; which would be a lengthy 
process if it were to be undertaken on a treaty-by-treaty 
basis. Introducing a multilateral instrument used to amend 
bilateral treaties going forward can solve this problem. 
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6.5 Issue 5: The need for swift implementation 
The delivery of these points identified in the action plan 
will require a number of outputs and amendments to 
domestic legislation.  Should the jurisdiction be willing to 
comply with these points identified in the action plan, a 
bilateral or multilateral agreement can be implemented in 
order to facilitate the adoptions (OECD, 2013).  
6.6 Comparison to the new South African HQCR 
A new South African HQC incorporated under the new 
South African HQCR is subject to the South African tax 
legislation. As previously mentioned in Chapter 5, the 
Income Tax Act imposes the anti-avoidance provisions 
identified above in the form of: 
 
• Transfer pricing legislation imposed under Section 
31; 
• CFC legislation under Section 9D; 
• Provisions to Hybrid Debt instruments under 
Section 8E and Section 8F; and 
• Exchange of information agreements in the DTAs. 
 
Although certain of these provisions have been relaxed in 
relation to a new South African HQC, there are still 
limitations imposed thereon (such as the limit on 
deductibility of debt in respect of transfer pricing). The 
application of these provisions would create difficulty to 
enter into base erosion and profit shifting transactions, as 
the restrictions would limit the resulting benefit. This can 
be seen from the examples below:  
 
Example 1. Although there are no restrictions imposed on 
thin capitalisation rules under a new South African HQC in 
terms of Section 31, BEPS would not be possible as there is 
a limit imposed on the deductibility of the interest expenses. 
Similarly should excessive interest income be earned by the 
new South African HQC, the income would be taxable at 
the corporate rate of 28%, resulting in a tax leakage. 
   
Example 2. Section 8E and 8F determine that where a 
hybrid debt instrument is entered into, the resulting income 
is taxable (i.e. the preference share income is taxable), 
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however, no corresponding deduction will occur in respect 
of preference dividends paid.  
 
Example 3. South Africa imposes a CFC regime under 
Section 9D of the Act. This has been relaxed in respect of 
the new South African HQCR. However as CFC legislation 
is aimed at avoiding instances where the income earned 
from a CFC is shifted to a low tax jurisdiction, as South 
Africa is not considered to be a low tax jurisdiction (i.e. at 
28% corporate tax rate), any income earned from a CFC 
will likely not be viewed as shifting of profits to a low tax 
jurisdiction.  
 
Example 4. South Africa has entered into exchange of 
information agreements in all the recent DTAs.  
As illustrated, South Africa already imposes most of the 
points identified in the action plan as identified at the G20 
conference. It is therefore determined that the initiative 
introduced will not impact the effectiveness of the new 
South African HQCR. Conversely, it may prove beneficial 
to the regime, as South Africa offers a headquarter 
company alternative that is in compliance with the G20 
initiative. 
6.7 Conclusion 
The G20 conference has identified the four risk areas that 
must be addressed, these areas are identified as follows: 
  
• the spread of the digital economy;  
• restoring the benefits of OECD international 
standards;  
• transparency of information; and  
• the swift implementation of this plan.  
 
These four risk areas are to be addresses through a number 
of the points identified in the action plan (action points) that 
must be implemented. These action points are intended to 
ensure that the BEPS does not occur through the commonly 
used profit shifting mechanisms.  
 
Specifically action points such as the prevention of DTA 
abuse, emphasis on transfer pricing and the transparency 
thereof, dispute resolution procedures are all designed to 
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avoid BEPS. It can be seen from this, that there is a direct 
attack on the establishment of tax havens worldwide.  
As the new South African HQCR does not fall foul of the 
profit shifting mechanisms associated with a harmful tax 
practices, it may prove to be an effective alternative to 
current tax havens as the world environment becomes 
increasingly difficult for tax havens to function in.  
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7. Chapter 7: Conclusion 
National Treasury has introduced the new South African HQCR in 
an attempt to create an ideal intermediary holding company 
jurisdiction. This conclusion is attributed to the fact that South 
Africa provides a central location and good infrastructure, from 
which to invest into Africa.  
 
An ideal intermediary holding company jurisdiction requires more 
than good location and infrastructure of the country, and should 
illustrate the best practice characteristics of an ideal headquarter 
company regime. The characteristics identified above are: 
 
• minimal or no effective tax rate;  
• lack of withholding taxes imposed on dividends, interest, 
royalties and management fees;  
• a large DTA network;  
• the absence of a CGT regime; 
• the absence of transfer pricing and thin capitalisation 
regimes; 
• the absence of a CFC regime; 
• the ability to maximise foreign tax credits; 
• the ability to undertake group restructurings without 
triggering adverse tax effects; 
• specific provisions addressing foreign exchange gains or 
losses to avoid taxation thereof on foreign transactions; 
• the absence of an exchange control regime to allow for 
reinvestments of capital growth and the free flow of funds.  
 
The new South African HQCR provides a few, but not all of these 
characteristics in that:  
 
• The Act provides for an exemption from withholding taxes 
in respect of dividend, interest, royalty and management fee 
payments made to non-resident shareholders;  
• South Africa has entered into a large number of DTAs that, 
in many instances, allow for reduced withholding tax rates 
to apply to transactions with foreign jurisdictions;  
• The exchange control regulations have been relaxed in 
respect of foreign investments made by the new South 
African HQC. This allows for the new South African HQC 
to retain any foreign capital growth outside of the South 
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African exchange control arena and to re-invest the funds as 
required; and    
• South Africa does not impose a tax on the increase in share 
capital, thereby allowing for an investor to provide 
additional funding in the form of equity shares without 
being subject to any additional tax thereon.   
 
Although National Treasury has provided for the above 
characteristics to manifest in the new South African HQC, other 
characteristics have only been relaxed in the legislation. These 
partially relaxed characteristics that still impose onerous 
restrictions are identified as: 
 
• Relaxation of the transfer pricing and thin capitalisation 
regime. The relaxation of this regime only applies in respect 
of foreign financing and royalty payments where the new 
South African HQC passes on the respective services to the 
foreign subsidiary companies. A limitation is imposed on 
the relaxation of the regime in terms of section 20C. 
Section 20 provides for a limit on the deductibility of the 
interest paid, (i.e. the interest expense is limited to the 
income earned from the subsidiary companies).  
• The Act allows for group reorganisations under the 
corporate rules in South Africa. The corporate rules require 
a transaction to meet onerous requirements. Should these 
requirements be met, the Act does not provide for any 
additional tax benefits (over and above the disregarding of 
the capital gain realised on the sale of the equity shares) 
such as a step up in the base cost. 
• Paragraph 64B of the Eighth schedule allows for the 
disregarding of a capital gain where equity shares have 
been sold by a new South African HQC (subject to certain 
requirements).  This treatment is not available for an 
already established South Africa resident company that 
wishes to enter the new South African HQCR, as this will 
give rise to a deemed disposal of the assets held by the 
South African company.  
• Sections 6quat and 6quin of the Act allows for a company 
to claim credit in respect of the foreign tax paid. The 
calculation of this credit is limited to the South African tax 
on the amount included in the taxable income of the 
company, deeming it impossible to achieve an optimisation 
of tax credit.  
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The remaining characteristics required by an intermediary 
company are not displayed at all by the new South African HQCR 
in that:  
 
• South Africa imposes a high corporate tax rate of 28% 
when compared to other intermediary company 
jurisdictions; 
• All transactions entered into by the new South African 
HQC must be translated to Rands, thereby incurring an 
additional taxable gain or loss in relation to the foreign 
exchange gain or loss.   
 
As illustrated above, many of the provisions offered by the new 
South African HQCR can be utilised outside of the regime. The 
remaining provisions are subject to requirements that impose a 
limiting effect on the possible benefits. In conclusion to the first 
sub-problem identified, it can be seen that the new South African 
HQCR does not display all of the best practice characteristics 
required by a headquarter company regime.  
 
When comparing to the new South African HQCR to Mauritius, 
which is regarded by Malan and Lessing (2012) as a popular and 
competing investment holding company regime, it will prove 
difficult for the new South African HQCR to compete as:   
 
• Mauritius imposes a minimal effective corporate tax rate of 
3%;   
• Even though Mauritius does not impose withholding tax at 
on dividends tax, there is a withholding tax imposed on 
interest, royalty and management fees of 15%, 15% and 
10% respectively.  This is more stringent than the new 
South African HQCR which provides a blanket exemption 
in respect of all withholding taxes;  
•  A diverse DTA network is a significant consideration as to 
whether or not a jurisdiction qualifies as an ideal 
intermediary holding company. This is imperative, to limit 
the withholding tax rates applied by certain countries 
(especially the African jurisdictions). Mauritius provides a 
total of 39 DTAs that have been entered into with other 
jurisdictions. In this respect South Africa proves to be a 
comparable jurisdiction as it has entered into and is 
currently negotiating a total of 90 DTAs with other 
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jurisdictions. These DTAs include jurisdictions that have 
not signed DTAs with more prominent intermediary 
holding company jurisdictions. Where these DTAs are 
found to be comparable to other holding company 
jurisdictions, this will prove to be an advantage for an 
offshore investor looking to invest into Africa. It is however 
noted that DTAs are also available to a South African 
resident company transacting with other jurisdictions and 
does not provide any benefits specifically aimed at a new 
South African HQC;  
• The repatriation of funds is easy to achieve in the absence 
of a thin capitalisation regime, as no limitation will exist on 
either the level of debt or equity invested into the company. 
This is possible under the legislation imposed by Mauritius 
as a thin capitalisation regime does not exist. This proves 
more difficult if the transaction is entered into as a sale 
agreement, as Mauritius transactions are required to be 
completed on an arm's length basis.  The new South 
African HQCR is not competitive in this area as the specific 
exemption from the transfer pricing and thin capitalisation 
provisions (relating to foreign financing and IP charges), 
under section 31 is still subject to a limit imposed on the 
corresponding deduction.  
• Another important characteristic of an ideal holding 
company jurisdiction is the absence of a CFC regime. This 
ensures that foreign subsidiary income is not repatriated 
back to the holding company jurisdiction.   
Neither Mauritius nor South Africa impose a CFC regime 
in respect of the headquarter company regimes, thereby 
allowing for all foreign subsidiary income to remain 
offshore.  
• Mauritius does not impose a CGT regime. This enables a 
foreign shareholder to sell non-profitable investments and 
undertake reorganisations based on commercial rationale.  
• Mauritius does not enforce an exchange control regime, 
thereby allowing for companies to freely transfer funds 
offshore without any restrictions.  This also proves true in 
South Africa, as exchange control regulations are relaxed in 
respect of the new South African HQCR.   
• The Mauritius Income Tax Act does not provide for 
specific foreign exchange provisions. Any foreign exchange 
gain or loss is therefore considered to be taxable or 
deductible under the normal corporate tax rate. This is 
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similar to the tax treatment in South Africa. These gains or 
losses will however be taxed at the corporate tax rate in 
both instances, the foreign exchange gain or loss will be 
susceptible to tax at a significantly lower rate in Mauritius 
(i.e. 3%) as opposed to the South African tax rate of 28%.  
 
Due to the generous tax system, Mauritius has been viewed in 
many instances as a tax haven. This is cemented by the fact that 
Mauritius illustrates the dominant methods used by a tax haven to 
shift funds. These methods have been identified as: 
 
• Debt or credit stripping, as Mauritius does not impose a thin 
capitalisation regime, thereby allowing the foreign investor 
to obtain a tax deduction in Mauritius for the interest paid 
to the non-resident shareholder. Should this interest be 
excessive, this would allow for a large tax deduction in 
Mauritius, and a reduction in the already low effective tax 
rate.  
• Cross crediting and foreign tax credits, as Mauritius 
provides for a deemed foreign tax credit of 80%, thereby 
reducing the effective tax rate to 3%;  
• Although Mauritius does not impose a thin capitalisation 
regime, the MRA does require that a transaction be 
completed on an arm's length basis, therefore a type of 
transfer pricing regime does apply in Mauritius;  
• Contract Manufacturing in a low tax jurisdiction, as the 
effective tax rate of 3% imposed by the MRA, creates a tax 
friendly environment in which to enter into the manufacture 
and sale of items, even when the product would be best 
suited to manufacture in a different jurisdiction.  
  
Conversely, these methods of profit shifting cannot be illustrated 
through the new South African HQCR as: 
 
• even though the thin capitalisation rules have been relaxed 
in terms of new South African HQCR, the benefits of the 
relaxation is limited due to the imposed ceiling on the 
deduction of the interest. This ceiling will prohibit the new 
HQC to transfer funds to obtain a tax deduction while 
simultaneously transferring funds to a low tax jurisdiction 
(i.e. debt or credit stripping); and   
• the sections 6quat and 6quin deductions allowed in respect 
of foreign tax credits are only claimable up to the lower of 
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the South African tax imposed on the foreign income 
included in taxable income and the actual foreign taxes 
paid. This limit would prohibit the new South African HQC 
to claim a foreign tax credit or deduction (from a high tax 
jurisdiction) against income earned from low tax 
jurisdiction (in respect of which a limited foreign taxes 
have been paid); and  
• Even though the transfer pricing rules have been relaxed for 
a new South African HQC in specific instances (such as 
financial assistance and royalty payments), a limit on the 
deductibility of these expenses is still imposed. This limit 
provides the same effect as if transfer pricing and thin  
capitalisation rules had applied; and 
• South Africa applies a corporate tax rate of 28% to the new 
South African HQCR; thereby it would not prove 
economically efficient to establish a manufacturing 
establishment in South Africa unless the items 
manufactured were directly sold in South Africa.  
 
When comparing the new South African HQCR to existing 
intermediary company regimes (such as Mauritius), the above 
considerations illustrate that the characteristics provided by the 
new South African HQCR are not considered unique, as it can be 
found in Mauritius. This problem is further aggravated by the fact 
that South Africa imposes the normal tax rate of 28% on new 
South African HQCs as opposed to the 3% offered by Mauritius. In 
instances where a DTA exist between both Mauritius and South 
Africa in a specific jurisdiction, it is likely that the potential 
investor will continue to use Mauritius as an intermediary holding 
company jurisdiction. South Africa does however offer a much 
wider DTA network, and in instances where a DTA only exists 
between a specific jurisdiction and South Africa, the new South 
African HQCR may prove to be a viable alternative.   
It is apparent that there is presently a large move against tax havens 
and countries that enter into harmful tax practices, which is 
illustrated by the increased number of jurisdictions that have been 
identified by the OECD and the EU.  Changing tax legislation 
makes it difficult to determine what meets the definition of a tax 
haven, and it is therefore more effective to identify a tax haven or a 
harmful tax regime based on its methods of profit shifting.  As 
determined above, the new South African HQCR does not illustrate 
the either harmful tax practices or profit shifting mechanisms that 
are normally displayed by tax havens and other similar regimes. 
The third sub-problem is therefore addressed in that the new South 
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African HQCR is not considered to fall foul of profit shifting 
mechanisms identified as harmful tax practices.  
 
This was again illustrated in regard to the action points identified at 
the G20 conference. The G20 conference endorsed the fight against 
tax havens by identifying 15 specific action points to limit BEPS. 
These action points are already incorporated into the South African 
tax legislation through the anti-avoidance provisions imposed by 
the Act(i.e. Section 31 - transfer pricing legislation, Section 9D - 
CFC legislation, Section 8E and Section 8F legislation). This 
changing landscape against harmful tax practices and base erosion 
and profit shifting may prove to be an advocate for the new South 
African HQCR in the future as an increasing number of current tax 
havens are amending their legislation to comply with the action 
points as determined by the OECD. 
 
Even though the new South African HQCR is unable to currently 
compete with alternative intermediary holding company regimes, 
this may not prove true in the future due to the increasing 
initiatives against current tax havens.   
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